Nonnaturalism

According to nonnaturalism, there are objective moral truths that must be sharply distinguished from scientific truths about the natural world. That is, there are moral propositions that are objectively true (perhaps “Genocide is wrong”), every bit as respectable and factual and mind-independent as “2 + 2 = 4” or “The earth orbits the sun”. But these objective moral truths are quite different from the objective truths discovered by the empirical sciences. Ethics is not about the natural world, and we cannot answer moral questions with empirical observation of the natural world. Indeed, for most nonnaturalists, ethical inquiry belongs in its very own domain.

See Moral Non-Naturalism (SEP) and Moral Realism (SEP)

Philosophers who have defended nonnaturalism:

Bibliography of philosophical work on nonnaturalism:

Traditional Nonnaturalism
Traditional nonnaturalism contends that there are objective moral properties lying beyond the natural world, and that we can come to have knowledge of these properties through rational intuition. The view is frequently criticized for being mysterious and “spooky”. It follows in the footsteps of G. E. Moore and his early 20th-century disciples. It can be compared to dualism in the philosophy of mind and Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics. Also known as: intuitionism, Mooreanism, Platonism.

See Moral Non-Naturalism (SEP) and Moral Realism (SEP)

Philosophers who have defended traditional nonnaturalism:

• G. E. Moore: The locus classicus of metaethical nonnaturalism. His 1903 book Principia Ethica introduces the open question argument and the naturalistic fallacy, and his 1922 article “The Conception of Intrinsic Value” introduces the idea of supervenience.
      Open Question Argument: Moore gives an argument against views which seek to understand goodness in terms of something else: e.g., “goodness is nothing more than being conducive to pleasure”, “goodness is nothing more than what we desire to desire”. In particular, Moore was trying to disprove views which would reductively identify goodness with anything naturalistic or metaphysical. The argument goes something like this (using pleasure as a simple example): (1) If goodness were nothing more than pleasure, then the question “Are all pleasant things good?” should be a closed question comparable to “Are all bachelors unmarried?” (2) But the question “Are all pleasant things good?” is not comparable to “Are all bachelors unmarried?”: it is an open question with great significance, not a closed question whose answer is so obvious as to be trivial. (3) Therefore, it is untrue that goodness is nothing more than pleasure. This argument is supposed to generalize: however we fill in the blank, questions of the form “Are all things which are ____ also good?” are always open and significant, never closed and trivial. This shows that goodness is its own thing, and cannot be understood in terms of anything naturalistic or metaphysical. Thus, even if you embrace the hedonist view that anything pleasant is good and that only pleasure can make something good, you must still acknowledge that such truths are not trivial but instead significant, for goodness is not the same thing as pleasure. For this reason, Moore concluded, ethics is its own discipline, and cannot be replaced with psychology or sociology or metaphysics.
      Naturalistic Fallacy: Moore accuses his opponents of committing the so-called “naturalistic fallacy”. What exactly Moore means is controversial, but on my interpretation, this fallacy consists in confusing goodness itself with the other properties of a thing that make it good. On Moore’s analogy, this would be like confusing yellow itself with the physical properties of a thing that make it yellow. Moore of course accuses “Naturalistic Ethics”, which would understand goodness in naturalistic terms, of committing this fallacy. But he also accuses “Metaphysical Ethics”, which would understand goodness in metaphysical terms, of committing the very same fallacy. For this reason, the label “naturalistic fallacy” is fairly misleading.
      Metaphysics: In his early work, Moore argued that the property goodness was neither a natural property (located in the natural world of space and time observed with the senses) nor a metaphysical property (located in a supersensible realm beyond space and time). Instead, Moore contended, goodness does not exist in any reality at all, but somehow is (in the same way that mathematical entities and propositions are without existing in any reality at all). In later work, Moore gave a different account of what makes intrinsic value metaphysically special: these value properties (e.g., goodness, beauty) are not themselves intrinsic properties, but they still supervene on intrinsic properties. To put it more carefully, these value properties are not among the intrinsic properties of a thing, for they do not describe the intrinsic nature of the things they belong to. But nevertheless they depend solely on on the intrinsic nature of the things they belong to, supervening with a distinctive form of necessity (an unconditional necessity other than logical necessity).
• Alexei Meinong?:
• Max Scheler?:
• Nicolai Hartmann?:
• J. N. Findlay?:
• C. D. Broad:
• E. F. Carritt:
• W. D. Ross:
• H. A. Prichard:
• A. C. Ewing: In his earliest works, Ewing was an able and steadfast defender of Moorean nonnaturalism. But later, in his “A Middle Way in Ethics”, Ewing significantly revised his theory in an attempt to accommodate the practicality of moral judgment, avoid any robust metaphysical commitments to nonnatural moral properties, and yet retain his fundamental commitment to objective moral truths knowable through rational intuition and featuring irreducible moral concepts. He developed a hybrid view, on which moral judgments perform both the non-cognitive function of expressing practical attitudes as well as the cognitive function of asserting that these attitudes are normatively required by the situation. And instead of being made true by direct correspondence with nonnatural moral properties, these assertions are made true by a sort of indirect correspondence with the facts of the situation, a move which led Ewing to posit objective moral laws. Ultimately, in his 1973 book Value and Reality, he ended up accounting for these objective moral laws by locating them in the mind of God. For an overview of the evolution of Ewing’s metaethics, see J. Olson & M. Timmons 2011.
• H. W. L. Joseph???: Some Main Problems in Ethics?
• D. D. Raphael??:
• John Laird??:
• Brand Blanshard??:
• H. J. McCloskey:
• Richard Swinburne: Swinburne defends a view on which moral terms and natural terms are not equivalent in meaning, moral properties are non-natural properties distinct from the natural properties they supervene upon, but the latter entail the moral properties so that necessary moral truths are analytic.
• Thomas Baldwin:
• Torbjörn Tännsjö:
• Caroline J. Simon:
• Jean Hampton: In her 1998 book, Hampton argues that all normativity—moral and instrumental and epistemic—is too mysterious to be accommodated by naturalism.
• Kit Fine: In his 2002 paper, Fine argues that normative necessity is one of three basic and distinct forms of necessity (alongside natural necessity and metaphysical necessity). He criticizes naturalist views which construe normative necessity as a form of conceptual necessity (Fine agrees with Moore about the naturalistic fallacy) or as a form of metaphysical necessity (contemporary “neo-naturalists” cannot accommodate “the non-empirical character of ethical belief”).
• Russ Shafer-Landau: Defends a version of nonnaturalism featuring a nonreductive-naturalist metaphysics, but an a priori-friendly epistemology.
• Donald H. Regan:
• Michael Huemer: His 2005 book is an extended defense of Moorean intuitionism. It focuses more on epistemology than metaphysics.
• Peter Schaber:
• Graham Oddie:
• William FitzPatrick:
• David Enoch:
• Nick Zangwill:
• Ralph Wedgwood:
• Erik Wielenberg:
• David Enoch:
• Caj Strandberg:
• Robert Audi:
• Roger Crisp: In his 2006 book, Crisp defends a version of ‘intuitionism’ bound to a metaphysics of normative properties: viz., some ordinary properties have the normative property of giving us reasons. But Crisp denies that these normative properties are metaphysically outlandish: they “need not be seen as, say, entities existing in some special realm, like Platonic forms” (74).
• David McNaughton:
• Terence Cuneo:
• Philip Stratton-Lake:
• Seiriol Morgan:
• Lee Shepski:
• Colin McGinn:
• Elizabeth Tropman: Defends a version of ‘intuitionism’ boasting down-to-earth metaphysics: its conception of moral properties is not objectionably nonnaturalistic, but instead compatible with broadly naturalistic constraints.
• Edmund Dain:
• Charles Larmore:

Bibliography of philosophical work on traditional nonnaturalism:

• Araña, U. T. 2009. “Yes to Realism! No to Non-Naturalism!” Kritike. 3. 168–77.
• Audi, R. 1996. “Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics.” In W. Sinnott-Armstrong & M. Timmons (eds.) Moral Knowledge? New York: Oxford University Press. 101–36.
• • [Reprint] Audi, R. 1996. “Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 402–19.
• Audi, R. 1997. Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Audi, R. 2004. The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Baldwin, T. 1985. “Ethical Non-Naturalism.” In I. Hacking (ed.) Exercises in Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 23–45.
• Ball, S. W. 1988. “Reductionism in Ethics and Science: A Contemporary Look at G. E. Moore’s Open-Question Argument.” American Philosophical Quarterly. 25. 197–213.
• Ball, S. W. 1988. “Evolution, Explanation, and the Fact/Value Distinction.” Biology and Philosophy. 3. 317–48.
• Ball, S. W. 1989. “Facts, Values, and Normative Supervenience.” Philosophical Studies. 55. 143–72.
• Ball, S. W. 1991. “Linguistic Intuitions and Varieties of Ethical Naturalism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 51. 1–38.
• Ball, S. W. 1995. “Gibbard’s Evolutionary Theory of Rationality and Its Ethical Implications.” Biology and Philosophy. 10. 129–80.
• Ball, S. W. 2003. “Review: G. E. Moore’s Ethical Theory by Brian Hutchinson.” Review of Metaphysics. 57. 415–19.
• Broad, C. D. 1940. “Review of Foundations of Ethics.” Mind. 49. 228–39.
• Carritt, E. F. 1928. Theory of Morals: An Introduction to Ethical Philosophy. London: Oxford University Press.
• Cuneo, T. 2007. The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Dancy, J. 2003. “From Intuitionism to Emotivism.” In T. Baldwin (ed.) The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870–1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 693–703.
• Enoch, D. 2007. “An Outline of an Argument for Robust Metanormative Realism.” In R. Shafer-Landau (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 21–50.
• Enoch, D. 2011. Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. New York: Oxford.
• Ewing, A. C. 1935. “Two Kinds of Analysis.” Analysis. 2. 60–64.
• Ewing, A. C. 1939. “A Suggested Nonnaturalistic Analysis of Good.” Mind. 48. 1–22.
• Ewing, A. C. 1947. The Definition of Good. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
• Ewing, A. C. 1948. “Philosophical Analysis.” In Philosophical Studies: Essays in Memory of L. Susan Stebbing. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• Ewing, A. C. 1950. “Philosophical Analysis in Ethics.” Philosophical Studies. 1. 74–80.
• Ewing, A. C. 1953. “A Middle Way in Ethics.” Analysis. 13: 33–8.
• Ewing, A. C. 1959. Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
• Ewing, A. C. 1961. “The Autonomy of Ethics.” In I. T. Ramsey (ed.) Prospects for Metaphysics. London: George Allen and Unwin.
• Ewing, A. C. 1951/1962. The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. First published in 1951 by Collier Books, New York.
• Ewing, A. C. 1953/1962. Ethics. New York: Collier Books. First published in 1953 by The Free Press, New York.
• Ewing, A. C. 1968 [1941]: “Reason and Intuition.” In his Non-Linguistic Philosophy. London: Routledge. Reprinted from Proceedings of the British Academy. 27.
• Ewing, A. C. 1968 [1962]: “The Correspondence Theory of Truth.” In his Non-Linguistic Philosophy. London: Routledge. Reprinted from The Personalist. 43.
• Ewing, A. C. 1970. “Are All A Priori Propositions and Inferences Analytic?” International Logic Review. 1. 77–87.
• Ewing, A. C. 1971. “The Problem of Universals.” Philosophical Quarterly. 21. 207–16.
• Ewing, A. C. 1973. Value and Reality: The Philosophical Case for Theism. London: George Allen and Unwin.
• Feldman, F. 2005. “The Open Question Argument: What It Isn’t; And What It Is.” Philosophical Issues. 15. 22–43.
• Fine, K. 2002. “The Varieties of Necessity.” In T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.) Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 253–81.
• FitzPatrick, W. J. 2008. “Robust Ethical Realism, Non-Naturalism, and Normativity.” In R. Shafer-Landau (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 3. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 159–205.
• Hampton, J. 1995. “Naturalism and Moral Reason.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 21 (Supplement). 107–33.
• • [Reprint] Hampton, J. 1995. “Naturalism and Moral Reason.” In J. Couture & K. Nielsen (eds.) On the Relevance of Metaethics. Calgary: University of Calgary. 1996. 107–33.
• Hampton, J. 1998. The Authority of Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• • [Excerpt] Hampton, J. 1998. “The Authority of Reason.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 206–09.
• Hudson, W. D. 1967. Ethical Intuitionism. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
• Huemer, M. 2000. “Naturalism and the Problem of Moral Knowledge.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 38. 575–97.
• Huemer, M. 2005. Ethical Intuitionism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Huemer, M. 2008. “Revisionary Intuitionism.” Social Philosophy & Policy. 25. 368–92.
• Larmore, C. 2008. The Autonomy of Morality. New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Little, M. 1994. “Moral Realism II: Non-Naturalism.” Philosophical Books. 35. 225–32.
• McCloskey, H. J. 1962. “Toward an Objectivist Ethics.” Ethics. 73. 10–27.
• McCloskey, H. J. 1969. Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
• McGinn, C. 1997. Ethics, Evil, and Fiction. New York: Oxford University Press.
• McNaughton, D. & P. Rawling. 2003. “Naturalism and Normativity: Descriptivism, Normativity, and the Metaphysics of Reasons.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 77 (Supplement). 23–45.
• Moore, G. E. 1903. Principia Ethica, revised edition, edited by T. Baldwin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1993.
• • [Excerpt] Moore, G. E. 1903. “The Open Question Argument: The Subject-Matter of Ethics.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 2006. 31–46.
  • [Excerpt] Moore, G. E. 1903. “The Subject-Matter of Ethics.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 465–73.
• Moore, G. E. 1922. “Preface to the Second Edition.” In his Principia Ethica, revised edition, edited by T. Baldwin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1993. 1–27.
• Moore, G. E. 1922. “The Conception of Intrinsic Value.” In his Philosophical Studies. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 253–75.
• • [Reprint] Moore, G. E. 1922. “The Conception of Intrinsic Value.” In his Principia Ethica, revised edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1993. 280–98.
• Moore, G. E. 1932. “Is Goodness a Quality?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 11 (Supplement). 116–31.
• • [Reprint] Moore, G. E. 1932. “Is Goodness a Quality?” In his Philosophical Papers. New York: MacMillan. 1959. 89–101.
• Moore, G. E. 1942. “A Reply to my Critics.” In P. A. Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 535–677.
• Morgan, S. 2006. “Naturalism and Normativity.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 72. 319–44.
• Oddie, G. 2005. Value, Reality, and Desire. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Regan, D. 2003. “How to Be a Moorean.” Ethics. 113. 651–77.
• Ross, W. D. 1927. “The Basis of Objective Judgements in Ethics.” International Journal of Ethics. 37. 113–27.
• Ross, W. D. 1930. The Right and The Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Ross, W. D. 1939. Foundations of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Scanlon, T. M. 2003. “Metaphysics and Morals.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. 77. 7–22.
• Schaber, P. 2004. “Good and Right as Non-Natural Properties.” In P. Schaber (ed.) Normativity and Naturalism. Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag. 105–20.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 1994. “Ethical Disagreement, Ethical Objectivism and Moral Indeterminacy.” Philosophy & Phenomenological Research. 54. 331–44.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 1994. “Supervenience and Moral Realism.” Ratio. 7. 145–52.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 1995. “Vagueness, Borderline Cases and Moral Realism.” American Philosophical Quarterly. 32. 83–96.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 1997. “Moral Rules.” Ethics. 107. 584–611.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 1998. “Moral Judgement and Moral Motivation.” Philosophical Quarterly. 48. 353–58.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 1999. “Moral Judgement and Normative Reasons.” Analysis. 59. 33–40.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 2000. “A Defense of Motivational Externalism.” Philosophical Studies. 97. 267–91.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 2001. “Ethical Subjectivism.” Reason and Responsibility, 11th edition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 513–25.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 2001. “Knowing Right from Wrong.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 79. 62–80.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 2003. Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 2003. “On the Evaluation of Rationality.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 41 (Supplement). 137–40.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 2005. “Rationalism in Ethics.” Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition. ??: Thomson. ??–??.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 2005. “Error Theory and the Possibility of Normative Ethics.” Philosophical Issues. 15. 107–20.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 2005. “Precis of Moral Realism: A Defence.” Philosophical Studies. 126. 263–67.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 2005. “Replies to Critics.” Philosophical Studies. 126. 313–29.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 2006. “Ethics as Philosophy: A Defense of Ethical Nonnaturalism.” In T. Horgan and M. Timmons (eds.) Metaethics after Moore. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 209–32.
• • [Reprint] Shafer-Landau, R. 2006. “Ethics as Philosophy: A Defense of Ethical Nonnaturalism.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 210–21.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 2007. “Audi’s Intuitionism.” Philosophy & Phenomenological Research. 74. 250–61.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 2007. “Moral Realism.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd edition. ??: Macmillan. ??–??.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 2007. “Moral and Theological Realism: The Explanatory Argument.” Journal of Moral Philosophy. ??: ??. 311–29.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 2007. “Defending Ethical Intuitionism.” In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) Moral Psychology: The Cognitive Science of Morality, volume 2. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 83–96.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 2009. “A Defense of Categorical Reasons.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 109. 191–208.
• • [Revised version] Shafer-Landau, R. 2009. “A Defense of Categorical Reasons.” In M. Krausz (ed.) Relativism: A Compendium. Columbia: Columbia University Press. 2010. ??–??.
• Shaver, R. 2007. “Non-Naturalism.” In S. Nuccetelli & G. Seay (eds.) Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. 283–306.
• Strandberg, C. 2004. “In Defence of the Open Question Argument.” Journal of Ethics. 8. 179–96.
• Stratton-Lake, P. (ed.) 2002. Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Swinburne, R. 1974. “Duty and the Will of God.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 4. 213–27.
• Swinburne, R. 1976. “The Objectivity of Morality.” Philosophy. 51. 5–20.
• Swinburne, R. 2008. “God and Morality.” Think. 20. 7–15.
• Tännsjö, T. 1990. Moral Realism. Savage, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield.
• Tropman, E. 2008. “Naturalism and the New Moral Intuitionism.” Journal of Philosophical Research. 33. 163–84.
• Wedgwood, R. 2006. “The Meaning of ‘Ought’.” In R. Shafer-Landau (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 127–60.
• Wedgwood, R. 2007. The Nature of Normativity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Wedgwood, R. 2010. “The Nature of Normativity: A Reply to Holton, Railton, and Lenman.” Philosophical Studies.
• Wielenberg, E. 2009. “In Defense of Non-Natural, Non-Theistic Moral Realism.” Faith and Philosophy. 26. 23–41.

Minimalist Nonnaturalism
Minimalist nonnaturalists jettison the otherworldly metaphysical commitments of traditional nonnaturalism. Instead of positing objective moral properties lying beyond the natural world, they contend that there are objective moral truths which do not require any metaphysical backing. Also known as: quietism, reasons fundamentalism.

Philosophers who have defended quietist nonnaturalism:

• Ronald Dworkin:
• Derek Parfit:
• Thomas Nagel:
• Thomas Scanlon:
• Jonathan Dancy:
• Matthew Kramer:

Bibliography of philosophical work on quietist nonnaturalism:

• Dancy, J. 2006. “Nonnaturalism.” In D. Copp (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 122–45.
• Dworkin, R. 1996. “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe it.” Philosophy and Public Affairs. 25. 87–139.
• Dworkin, R. 1997. “Reply by Ronald Dworkin.” Brown Electronic Article Review Service. http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/9704dwor.html. Posted 9 April 1997.
• Dworkin, R. 2010. “Response.” Boston University Law Review. 90. 1059–87.
• Dworkin, R. 2011. Justice for Hedghogs. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
• Ehrenberg, K. M. 2008. “Archimedean Metaethics Defended.” Metaphilosophy. 39. 508–29.
• Fantl, J. 2006. “Is Metaethics Morally Neutral?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 87. 24–44.
• Parfit, D. 2006. “Normativity.” In R. Shafer-Landau (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 325–80.
• Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What We Owe To Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Scanlon, T. M. 2003. “Metaphysics and Morals.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. 77. 7–22.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 2010. “Dworkin and the Possibility of Metaethics.” Boston University Law Review. 90. 101–17.
• Zangwill, N. 1996. “Zangwill Reviews Dworkin.” Brown Electronic Article Review Service. http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/9612zang.html. Posted 2 December 1996.

Naturalism
According to metaethical naturalism, there are objective moral truths which are nothing more mysterious than scientific descriptions of the natural world (like “The earth orbits the sun”), with moral properties like rightness and virtue deemed every bit as scientifically respectable and empirically tractable as valence and reproductive fitness. Much work on metaethical naturalism runs parallel to similar ‘naturalization’ projects in contemporary philosophy of mind and epistemology, but some forms hearken back to traditional teleological conceptions of nature less associated with Enlightenment materialism.

See Moral Naturalism (SEP), Moral Realism (SEP), Naturalism﹥Naturalism in Ethics (IEP)

Philosophers who have defended naturalism:

Bibliography of philosophical work on naturalism:

Cornell Realism
Cornell realism is probably the most prominent attempt to bring objective moral facts into harmony with a broadly scientific naturalism. Mackie and Harman presented their naturalistic case against objective morality in the late ’70s, and in the ’80s the Cornell realists rose to the challenge. Like all metaethical naturalists, Cornell realists hold that there are objective moral properties which belong to the natural world, and that moral judgments are ordinary descriptive beliefs whose job it is to faithfully represent those properties. To this they typically add the following commitments:

• Reference without analysis: Suppose Moore is right that moral terms and concepts cannot be given a naturalistic analysis. Still, they might refer to naturalistic ontology—in much the same way that an ordinary term like ‘water’ or ‘baking soda’ cannot be analyzed with any chemical formula, but still refers to chemical substances like H₂O and NaHCO₃. Such a ‘reference without analysis’ approach offers Cornell realists a way around the open question argument, with recent philosophical work on reference (especially the causal theory associated with Kripke) providing the framework for a tenable naturalistic moral semantics.
• Nonreductive naturalistic metaphysics: Just as nonreductive materialists find themselves pressed by multiple realizability to deny type-type property identities, Cornell realists commonly deny that moral properties can be identified with natural properties. But since they still locate moral properties squarely within the natural world, they appeal to other naturalist-friendly metaphysical connections: e.g., exhaustive constitution, functional realization, token-token property identity.
• Externalism: Cornell realists deny that moral judgments must come with corresponding motivation (i.e., they accept the possibility of unmotivated “amoralists”), and deny that moral properties must come with corresponding normative reasons (i.e., they think one can have no reason to be moral). What connection there is between morality and motivation, and between morality and reasons, is only a contingent connection grounded in human nature: the main reason we care about moral facts is that they often concern others’ well-being, and we have a capacity for sympathy with others. This move helps Cornell realists avoid Mackie’s argument that morality includes an intolerably queer commitment to “objective prescriptivity”.
• Moral explanation: They disagree with Harman about the explanatory power of moral properties: for Cornell realists, moral properties have a respectable role to play in explaining the moral observations we make and the changes that individuals and whole societies undergo.

Cornell realists borrow many of their techniques from recent work in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science. Their view can be compared to non-reductive materialism about the mind-body problem and scientific realism.

See Moral Naturalism﹥Contemporary Naturalism﹥Cornell Realism (SEP)

Philosophers who have defended Cornell realism:

• Richard Boyd:
• David O. Brink:
• Richard W. Miller:
• Nicholas Sturgeon:

Bibliography of philosophical work on Cornell realism:

• Boyd, R. 1988. “How to be a Moral Realist.” In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.) Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 187–228.
• • [Reprint+] Reprinted with “Postscript: Materialism and Realism in Metaethics” in P. K. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.) 1995. Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. London: Routledge. 307–70.
  • [Reprint] Boyd, R. 1988. “How to be a Moral Realist.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 163–85.
• Boyd, R. 2003. “Finite Beings, Finite Goods: The Semantics, Metaphysics and Ethics of Naturalist Consequentialism, Part I.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 66. 505–53.
• Boyd, R. 2003. “Finite Beings, Finite Goods: The Semantics, Metaphysics and Ethics of Naturalist Consequentialism, Part II.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 67. 24–47.
• Brink, D. O. 1984. “Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments from Disagreement and Queerness.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 62. 111–25.
• [Reprint] Brink, D. O. 1984. “Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments from Disagreement and Queerness.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 2006. 80–95.
• Brink, D. O. 1986. “Externalist Moral Realism.” Southern Journal of Philosophy (Spindel Conference Supplement on Moral Realism). 24. 23–40.
• Brink, D. O. 1987. “Rawlsian Constructivism in Moral Theory.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 17. 71–90.
• Brink, D. O. 1987. “Review: Ethics, Persuasion and Truth by J. J. C. Smart.” Philosophical Review. 96. 290–95.
• Brink, D. O. 1989. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Brink, D. O. 1992. “A Puzzle about the Rational Authority of Morality.” Philosophical Perspectives. 6. 1–26.
• Brink, D. O. 1997. “Moral Motivation” (Symposium on Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem). Ethics. 108. 4–32.
• Brink, D. O. 2001. “Realism, Naturalism, and Moral Semantics.” Social Philosophy and Policy. 18. 154–76.
• Gampel, E. H. 1996. “A Defense of the Autonomy of Ethics: Why Value is not like Water.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 26. 191–210.
• Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 1990–91. “New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth.” Journal of Philosophical Research. 16. 447–65.
• • [Reprint] Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 1990–91. “New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth.” In J. Heil (ed.) Rationality, Morality, and Self-Interest: Essays Honoring Mark Carl Overvold. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 115–33.
  • [Reprint] Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 1990–91. “New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 495–??.
• Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 1992. “Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The ‘Open Question Argument’ Revived.” Philosophical Papers. 21. 153–75.
  • [Reprint] Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 1992. “Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The ‘Open Question Argument’ Revived.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. 2006. London: Routledge.
• Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 1992. “Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revisited.” Synthese. 92. 221–60.
• Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 1996. “From Moral Realism to Moral Relativism in One Easy Step.” Crítica. 28. 3–39.
• Miller, R. W. 1992. Moral Differences: Truth, Justice and Conscience in a World of Conflict. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Sturgeon, N. 1982. “Brandt’s Moral Empiricism.” Philosophical Review. 91. 374–402.
• Sturgeon, N. 1985. “Moral Explanations.” In D. Copp & D. Zimmerman (eds.) Morality, Reason, and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld. 49–78.
• • [Reprint] Sturgeon, N. 1985. “Moral Explanations.” In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.) Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1988. 229–55.
  • [Reprint] Sturgeon, N. 1985. “Moral Explanations.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 2006. ??–??.
  • [Reprint] Sturgeon, N. 1985. “Moral Explanations.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 337–52.
• Sturgeon, N. 1986. “Harman on Moral Explanations of Natural Facts.” Southern Journal of Philosophy (Spindel Conference Supplement on Moral Realism). 24. 69–78.
• Sturgeon, N. 1986. “What Difference Does it Make Whether Moral Realism is True?” Southern Journal of Philosophy (Spindel Conference Supplement on Moral Realism). 24. 115–42.
• Sturgeon, N. 1991. “Contents and Causes: A Reply to Blackburn.” Philosophical Studies. 61. 19–37.
• Sturgeon, N. 1992. “Nonmoral Explanations.” Philosophical Perspectives. 6. 97–117.
• Sturgeon, N. 2002. “Ethical Intuitionism and Ethical Naturalism.” In P. Stratton-Lake (ed.) Ethical Intuitonism: Re-evaluations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 184–211.
• Sturgeon, N. 2003. “Moore on Ethical Naturalism.” Ethics. 113. 528–56.
• Sturgeon, N. 2006. “Ethical Naturalism.” In D. Copp (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. New York: Oxford University Press. 91–101.
• Sturgeon, N. 2006. “Moral Explanations Defended.” In J. Dreier (ed.) Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. 241–62.
• Timmons, M. 1999. Morality without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Yasenchuk, K. 1994. “Sturgeon and Brink on Moral Explanations.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 32. 483–502.
• Yasenchuk, K. 1995. “Assimilative Moral Realism and Supervenience.” Dialogue. 34. 75–97.
• Yasenchuk, K. 1997. “Moral Realism and the Burden of Argument.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 35. 247–64.

Analytic Moral Functionalism

Analytic moral functionalism is the product of applying a general philosophical program to morality. The program goes back to the functionalist accounts of mind-body materialism developed in the 1960s by David Lewis and David Armstrong. It has since become the unofficial philosophy of Australia (often called “the Canberra Plan”), and it can be applied to such wide-ranging topics as the mind-body problem, the metaphysics of color, free will, and morality. Roughly, a philosopher starts with a collection of folk platitudes about something, takes this as providing a working conceptual analysis, uses empirical observation to find anything in the physical world that largely satisfies the platitudes, and declares victory for naturalistic / materialistic realism if the search proves successful. Just as Lewis and Armstrong were optimistic materialists expecting to find brain states for mental terms to refer to, likewise Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit are optimistic about finding natural properties that satisfy the platitudes of folk morality (or at least the “mature” folk morality that would eventually result from the right kind of reflection). Thus they are naturalistic moral realists. But if nothing in the world satisfies the platitudes, then error-theory results. And if different groups accept different folk moralities (even upon reflection), then a form of relativism results. But Jackson is confident that non-naturalism will not result, because the strong supervenience implicit in folk morality means that non-naturalists would end up with two sets of necessarily coextensive properties—a fatal consequence according to Jackson.

See Moral Naturalism﹥Jackson’s Moral Functionalism (SEP), Naturalism﹥The Canberra Plan (SEP)

Philosophers who have defended analytic moral functionalism:

• Frank Jackson:
• Philip Pettit:

Bibliography of philosophical work on analytic moral functionalism:

• Barnett, D. 2002. “Against A Posteriori Moral Naturalism.” Philosophical Studies. 107. 239–57.
• Hatzimoysis, A. 2002. “Analytical Descriptivism Revisited.” Ratio. 15. 10–22.
• Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 2009. “Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth.” In I. Ravenscroft (ed.) Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 221–36.
• Jackson, F. & P. Pettit. 1995. “Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation.” Philosophical Quarterly. 45. 21–40.
• Jackson, F. & P. Pettit. 1996. “Moral Functionalism, Supervenience and Reductionism.” Philosophical Quarterly. 46. 82–6.
• Jackson, F. 1992. “Critical Notice of Susan Hurley’s Natural Reasons.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 70. 475–87.
• • [Reprint] Jackson, F. 1992. “Critical Notice of Hurley.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) 2006. Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 200–14.
• Jackson, F. 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• • [Excerpt] Jackson, F. 1998. “The Supervenience of the Ethical on the Descriptive.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 449–54.
• Jackson, F. 2009. “Response to Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons.” In I. Ravenscroft (ed.) Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ??–??.
• Pettit, P. 2001. “Embracing Objectivity in Ethics.” In B. Leiter (ed.) Objectivity in Law and Morals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 234–86.
• Robinson, D. 2009. “Moral Functionalism, Ethical Quasi-Relativism, and the Canberra Plan.” In D. Braddon-Mitchell and R. Nola (eds.) Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 315–48.
• van Roojen, M. 1996. “Moral Functionalism and Moral Reductionism.” Philosophical Quarterly. 46. 77–81.
• Zangwill, N. 2000. “Against Analytic Moral Functionalism.” Ratio. 13. 275–86.

Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism

Neo-Aristotelian naturalism is...

See Moral Naturalism﹥Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism (SEP)

Philosophers who have defended neo-Aristotelian naturalism:

• Philippa Foot:
• Judith Jarvis Thomson:
• Peter Geach?:
• Elizabeth Anscombe:
• Martha Nussbaum:
• Rosalind Hursthouse:
• Paul Bloomfield:
• Michael Thompson?:

Bibliography of philosophical work on neo-Aristotelian naturalism:

• Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958. “Modern Moral Philosophy.” Philosophy. 33. 1–10.
• Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958. “On Brute Facts.” Analysis. 18. 69–72.
• Anscombe, G. E. M. 1957. Intention. Oxford: Blackwell.
• • Anscombe, G. E. M. 2000. Intention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Antony, L. 2000. “Natures and Norms.” Ethics. 111. 8–36.
• Bloomfield, P. 2001. Moral Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Foot, P. 2001. Natural Goodness. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Geach, P. T. 1956. “Good and Evil.” Analysis. 17. 33–42.
• Hursthouse, R. 1999. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Harman, G. & J. J. Thomson. 1996. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Oxford: Blackwell.
• Lenman, J. 2006. “The Saucer of Mud, The Kudzu Vine and the Uxorious Cheetah: Against Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism in Metaethics.” European Journal of Analytic Philosophy. 37–50.
• McDowell, J. 1995. “Two Sorts of Naturalism.” In R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, & W. Quinn (eds.) Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 49–79.
  • [Reprint] McDowell, J. 1995. “Two Sorts of Naturalism.” In his Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1998. 167–97.
• Nussbaum, M. C. 1995. “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics.” In J. E. J. Altham & R. Harrison (eds.) World, Mind and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 86–131.
• Thomson, J. J. 1997. “The Right and the Good.” Journal of Philosophy. 94. 273–98.
• Thomson, J. J. 2001. Goodness and Advice. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Thompson, A. 2007. “Reconciling Themes in Neo-Aristotelian Meta-Ethics.” Journal of Value Inquiry. 41. 245–63.
• Thompson, M. 1995. “The Representation of Life.” In R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, & W. Quinn (eds.) Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 247–96.
• Thompson, M. 2008. Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Full-Information Naturalism

Philosophers who have defended full-information naturalism:

• Peter Railton:

Bibliography of philosophical work on full-information naturalism:

• Kelly, E. I. 2004. “Against Naturalism in Ethics.” In M. De Caro & D. MacArthur (eds.) Naturalism in Question. Harvard: Harvard University Press. 259–74.
• Kelly, E. I. & L. K. McPherson. 2010. “The Naturalist Gap in Ethics.” In M. De Caro & D. MacArthur (eds.) Naturalism and Normativity. New York: Columbia University Press. 193–204.
• Loeb, D. 1995. “Full-Information Theories of Individual Good.” Social Theory and Practice. 21. 1–30.
• Railton, P. 1986. “Moral Realism.” Philosophical Review. 95. 163–207.
• • [Reprint] Railton, P. 1986. “Moral Realism.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) 2006. Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge.
  • [Reprint] Railton, P. 1986. “Moral Realism.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 186–205.
• Railton, P. 1986. “Facts and Values.” Philosophical Topics. 14. 5–31.
• Railton, P. 1989. “Naturalism and Prescriptivity.” Social Philosophy and Policy. 7. 151–74.
• Railton, P. 1992. “Some Questions about the Justification of Morality.” Philosophical Perspectives. 6. 27–53.
• Railton, P. 1992. “Nonfactualism about Normative Discourse” (Symposium on Allan Gibbard’s Wise Choices, Apt Feelings). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 52. 961–68.
• • This reappears as section I of “Noncognitivism about Rationality: Benefits, Costs, and an Alternative”.
• Railton, P. 1993. “Noncognitivism about Rationality: Benefits, Costs, and an Alternative.” Philosophical Issues. 4. 36–51.
• • Section I was first published as “Nonfactualism about Normative Discourse”.
• Railton, P. 1993. “What the Noncognitivist Helps Us to See the Naturalist Must Help Us to Explain.” In J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.) Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 279–300.
• Railton, P. 1993. “Reply to David Wiggins.” In J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.) Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 315–28.
• Railton, P. 1995. “Subject-ive and Objective.” Ratio. 8. 259–76.
• Railton, P. 1995. “Made in the Shade: Moral Compatibilism and the Aims of Moral Theory.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 21 (Supplement). 79–106.
• • [Reprint] Railton, P. 1995. “Made in the Shade: Moral Compatibilism and the Aims of Moral Theory.” In J. Couture & K. Nielsen (eds.) On the Relevance of Metaethics. Calgary: University of Calgary. 1996. 79–106.
• Railton, P. 1996. “Moral Realism: Prospects and Problems.” In W. Sinnott-Armstrong & M. Timmons (eds.) Moral Knowledge? New York: Oxford University Press. 49–81.
• Railton, P. 1996. “The Diversity of Moral Dilemmas.” In H. E. Mason (ed.) Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 140–66.
• Railton, P. 1996. “In Search of Non-Subjective Reasons.” In J. Schneewind (ed.) Reason, Ethics and Society: Themes from Kurt Baier, with His Responses.. Chicago: Open Court. 117–43.
• Railton, P. 1997. “On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Action.” In G. Cullity & B. Gaut (eds.) Ethics and Practical Reason. City: Press. 53–79.
• Railton, P. 1998. “Moral Explanation and Moral Objectivity.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 58. 175–82.
• Railton, P. 1998. “Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of Naturalism.” In J. Levinson (ed.) Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 59–105.
• Railton, P. 1998. “Red, Bitter, Good.” In R. Casati & C. Tappolet (eds.) European Review of Philosophy, volume 3: Response-Dependence. Stanford: CSLI Publications. 67–83.
• Railton, P. 1999. “Normative Force and Normative Freedom: Hume and Kant, But not Hume versus Kant.” Ratio. 12. 320–53.
• Railton, P. 2003. Facts, Values and Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Railton, P. 2004. “How to Engage Reason: The Problem of Regress.” In R. J. Wallace, et al. (eds.) Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. New York: Oxford University Press. 176–201.
• Railton, P. 2004. “Towards an Ethics that Inhabits the World.” In B. Leiter (ed.) The Future for Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 265–84.
• Railton, P. 2006. “Moral Factualism.” In J. Dreier (ed.) Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. 201–19.
• Railton, P. 2006. “Normative Guidance.” In R. Shafer-Landau (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3–33.
• Rosati, C. 1995. “Naturalism, Normativity, and the Open Question Argument.” Noûs. 29. 46–70.
• Rosati, C. 1995. “Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good.” Ethics. 105. 296–325.
• Sinclair, N. 2006. “Two Kinds of Naturalism in Ethics.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 9. 417–39.
• Sobel, D. 1994. “Full Information Accounts of Well-Being.” Ethics. 104. 784–810.

Constructivism/Subjectivism
According to this diverse family of theories, there are moral facts, but they are not to be found in some mind-independent reality. Instead, moral facts are best understood in terms of certain persons and certain of their psychological features—most commonly, their stance-taking evaluations (e.g., volitions, preferences, personal commitments) and the general perspective underlying any such evaluation (e.g., one’s moral sensibility, instrumental rationality, practical reason). These theories usually take the less realist side of the Euthyphro dilemma, with moral facts more invented than discovered, more made than found, so that wrong things count as wrong because they are negatively evaluated rather than the other way around. Different theories work with different “persons” (from messy real-world human beings to hypothetical ideal observers and even God himself) and end up differing dramatically on key questions of objectivity: e.g., some think there is a single necessarily correct set of moral facts for everyone, some that there are (or could be) different moral facts for different people.

See Constructivism in Metaethics (SEP) and Constructivism in Metaethics (IEP)

Philosophers who have defended constructivism/subjectivism:

Bibliography of philosophical work on constructivism/subjectivism:

Moral Relativism

Moral relativists deny objective moral truth, but do not deny moral truth altogether. Instead, they offer an account of moral truth as something relativized to variable individual feelings or (most commonly) to variable cultural norms: e.g., “Murderers deserve to be executed” is true relative to Iran’s norms and false relative to Iceland’s. The view is often associated with an ethic of tolerance and non-judgmentalism. As a first-order normative theory, moral relativism would merely say that something‘s moral status is determined by how the relevant cultural norms evaluate it. As a metaethical theory, moral relativism would use those norms to account for the very nature of moral properties or the very content of moral judgments. The view may be more popular outside philosophy than within it, and introductory ethics courses are forever haunted by the specter of the so-called “freshman relativist”.

See Moral Relativism (SEP), Relativism (SEP), Moral Relativism (IEP), and Relativism (IEP).

Philosophers who have defended moral relativism:

• Edward Westermarck:
• Gilbert Harman:
• David B. Wong:
• David Phillips:
• Max Hocutt:
• Steve F. Sapontzis:
• Jamie Dreier:

Bibliography of philosophical work on moral relativism:

• Brogaard, B. 2008. “Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism.” Philosophical Quarterly. 58. 385–409.
• Brogaard, B. 2012. “Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 50. 538–56.
• Capps, D., M. P. Lynch, & D. Massey. 2009. “A Coherent Moral Relativism.” Synthese. 166. 413–30.
• Cooper, D. E. “Moral Relativism.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy. 3. 97–108.
• Dreier, J. 1990. “Internalism and Speaker Relativism.” Ethics. 101. 6–26.
• Dreier, J. 2006. “Moral Relativism and Moral Nihilism.” In D. Copp (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 240–64.
• Dreier, J. 2009. “Relativism (and Expressivism) and the Problem of Disagreement.” Philosophical Perspectives. 23. 79–110.
• Egan, A. 2012. “Relativist Dispositional Theories of Value.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 50. 557–82.
• Hales, S. D. 2009. “Moral Relativism and Evolutionary Psychology.” Synthese. 166. 431–47.
• Harman, G. 1975. “Moral Relativism Defended.” Philosophical Review. 84. 3–22.
• • [Reprint] Harman, G. 1975. “Moral Relativism Defended.” In his Explaining Value: And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2000. 3–19.
  • [Reprint] Harman, G. 1975. “Moral Relativism Defended.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 84–92.
• Harman, G. 1977. The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
• • [Reprint] Harman, G. 1977. “Ethics and Observation.” In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.) Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1988. 119–26.
  • [Reprint] Harman, G. 1977. “Ethics and Observation.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 333–36.
• Harman, G. 1978. “Relativistic Ethics: Morality as Politics.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy. 3. 109–21.
• Harman, G. 1979. “What is Moral Relativism?” In A. I. Goldman and J. Kim (eds.) Values and Morals. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 143–61.
• Harman, G. 1980. “Moral Relativism as a Foundation for Natural Rights.” Journal of Libertarian Studies. 4. 367–71.
• Harman, G. 1982. “Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth, and History.” Journal of Philosophy. 79. 568–75.
• Harman, G. 1983. “Justice and Moral Bargaining.” Social Philosophy and Policy. 1. 114–31.
• Harman, G. 1983. “Human Flourishing, Ethics, and Liberty.” Philosophy and Public Affairs. 12. 307–22.
• Harman, G. 1985. “Is There a Single True Morality?” In D. Copp & D. Zimmerman (eds.) Morality, Reason, and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld. 27–48.
• • [Reprint] Harman, G. 1985. “Is There a Single True Morality?” In his Explaining Value: And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2000. 77–99.
• Harman, G. 1987. “Rationality and Agreement: A Commentary on Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement.” Social Philosophy and Policy. 5. 1–16.
• Harman, G. & J. J. Thomson. 1996. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Oxford: Blackwell.
• Harman, G. 1998. “Responses to Critics.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 58. 207–13.
• Hocutt, M. 1963. “Ethical Relativisms and Ethical Relativism.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 1. 19–26.
• Hocutt, M. 1977. “Skinner on the Word ‘Good’: A Naturalistic Semantics for Ethics.” Ethics. 87. 319–38.
• Hocutt, M. 1986. “Must Relativists Tolerate Evil?” Philosophical Forum. 17. 188–200.
• Hocutt, M. 1994. “Relativism and Moral Judgements: A Reply to Sullivan.” Philosophia. 24. 203–10.
• Hocutt, M. 2000. Grounded Ethics: The Empirical Bases of Normative Judgments. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
• Hocutt, M. 2009. “Naturalist Moral Theory: A Reply to Staddon.” Behavior and Philosophy. 37. 165–80.
• Hocutt, M. 2009. “Values: A Reply to Staddon’s ‘Faith and Goodness’.” Behavior and Philosophy. 37. 187–94.
• Phillips, D. 1997. “How to Be a Moral Relativist.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 35. 393–417.
• Phillips, D. 1998. “The Middle Ground in Moral Semantics.” American Philosophical Quarterly. 35. 141–55.
• Robinson, D. 2009. “Moral Functionalism, Ethical Quasi-Relativism, and the Canberra Plan.” In D. Braddon-Mitchell and R. Nola (eds.) Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 315–48.
• Sapontzis, S. F. 1987. “Moral Relativism: A Causal Interpretation and Defense.” American Philosophical Quarterly. 24. 329–37.
• Sapontzis, S. F. 1990. “Groundwork for a Subjective Theory of Ethics.” American Philosophical Quarterly. 27. 27–38.
• Streiffer, R. 2003. Moral Relativism and Reasons for Action. London: Routledge.
• Tännsjö, T. 2007. “Moral Relativism.” Philosophical Studies. 135. 123–43.
• Westermarck, E. 1906–8. The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, 2 volumes. New York: The Macmillan Company.
• Westermarck, E. 1932. Ethical Relativity. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
• Wong, D. B. 1984. Moral Relativity. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
• Wong, D. B. 1986. “Response to Kupperman’s Review of Moral Relativity.” Philosophy East and West. 36. 275–82.
• Wong, D. B. 1989. “Three Kinds of Incommensurability.” In M. Krausz (ed.) Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press. 140–59.
• Wong, D. B. 1990. “A Relativist Alternative to Antirealism.” Journal of Philosophy. 87. 617–18.
• Wong, D. B. 1991. “Commentary on Sayre-McCord’s ‘Being a Realist about Relativism’.” Philosophical Studies. 61. 177–86.
• Wong, D. B. 1991. “Relativism.” In P. Singer (ed.) A Companion to Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. 442–50.
• Wong, D. B. 1992. “Coping with Moral Conflict and Ambiguity.” Ethics. 102. 763–83.
• Wong, D. B. 1992. “Moral Relativism.” In L. C. Becker & C. B. Becker (eds.) Encyclopedia of Ethics. New York: London. Volume 2, 856–59.
• Wong, D. B. 1996. “Pluralistic Relativism.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy. 20. 378–99.
• Wong, D. B. 1998. “Moral Relativism.” In E. Craig (ed.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Taylor & Francis. Volume 6, 539–42.
• Wong, D. B. 2006. Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Wong, D. B. 2011. “Relativist Explanations of Interpersonal and Group Disagreement.” In S. D. Hales (ed.) A Companion to Relativism. Oxford: Blackwell. 411–29.

Theological Metaethics

Philosophers who have defended theological metaethics:

• Robert M. Adams:
• William P. Alston:
• Philip Quinn:
• Linda Zagzebski:
• Edward Wierenga:
• Janine M. Idziak:
• John Hare:
• Stephen R. L. Clark:
• George Mavrodes:
• Katherin Rogers:
• Kyle Swan:
• Alvin Plantinga?:
• Michael Rea?:
• Thomas L. Carson?:

Bibliography of philosophical work on theological metaethics:

• Adams, R. M. 1973. “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness.” In G. Outka & J. P. Reeder, Jr. (eds.) Religion and Morality. Garden City: Anchor. 318–47.
• • [Reprint] Adams, R. M. 1973. “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness.” In P. Helm (ed.) Divine Commands and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1981. 83–108.
  • [Reprint] Adams, R. M. 1973. “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness.” In his The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1987. 97–122.
• Adams, R. M. 1979. “Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again.” Journal of Religious Ethics. 7. 66–79.
• • [Reprint] Adams, R. M. 1979. “Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again.” In his The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1987. 128–43.
• Adams, R. M. 1979. “Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief.” In C. F. Delaney (ed.) Rationality and Religious Belief. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 116–40.
• • [Reprint] Adams, R. M. 1979. “Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief.” In his The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1987. 144–63.
• Adams, R. M. 1987. The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Adams, R. M. 1987. “Divine Commands and the Social Nature of Obligation.” Faith and Philosophy. 4. 262–75.
• Adams, R. M. 1993. “Prospects for a Metaethical Argument for Theism: A Response to Stephen J. Sullivan.” Journal of Religious Ethics. 21. 313–18.
• Adams, R. M. 1999. Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Adams, R. M. 2002. “Précis of Finite and Infinite Goods” (Symposium on Robert M. Adams’s Finite and Infinite Goods). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 64. 439–44.
• Adams, R. M. 2002. “Responses” (Symposium on Robert M. Adams’s Finite and Infinite Goods). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 64. 475–90.
• Adams, R. M. 2006. “Critical Review of Linda Zagzebski’s Divine Motivation Theory.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 73. 493–97.
• Almeida, M. 2005. “Supervenience and Property-Identical Divine-Command Theory.” Religious Studies. 40. 323–33.
• Alston, W. P. 1990. “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists.” In M. Beaty (ed.) Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 303–26.
• Alston, W. P. 2002. “What Euthyphro Should Have Said.” In W. L. Craig (ed.) Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 283–98.
• Alston, W. P. 2005. “Reply to Zagzebski.” In H. D. Battaly & M. P. Lynch (eds.) Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 203–07.
• Bishop, J. 1985. “Theism, Morality, and the ‘Why Should I Be Moral?’ Question.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 17. 3–21.
• Burch, R. 1980. “Objective Values and the Divine Command Theory.” New Scholasticism. 54. 279–304.
• Chandler, J. 1984. “Is the Divine Command Theory Defensible?” Religious Studies. 20. 443–52.
• Chandler, J. 1985. “Clark on God’s Law and Morality.” The Philosophical Quarterly. 35. 87–90.
• Chandler, J. 1985. “Divine Command Theories and the Appeal to Love.” American Philosophical Quarterly. 22. 231–39.
• Clark, S. R. L. 1982. “God’s Law and Morality.” Philosophical Quarterly. 32. 339–47.
• Clark, S. R. L. 1987. “God’s Law and Chandler.” Philosophical Quarterly. 37. 203–08.
• Coulter, C. L. “Moral Autonomy and Divine Commands.” Religious Studies. 25. 117–29.
• Hare, J. 1997. The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God’s Assistance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Hare, J. 2001. God’s Call. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
• Hare, J. 2005. “Review of Linda Zagzebski’s Divine Motivation Theory.” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 2005.02.13.
• Hill, S. 2010. “Richard Joyce’s New Objections to the Divine Command Theory.” Journal of Religious Ethics. 38. 189–196.
• Hooker, B. 2001. “Cudworth and Quinn.” Analysis. 61. 333–35.
• Idziak, J. M. (ed.) 1979. Divine Command Morality: Historical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Edwin Mellen.
• Idziak, J. M. 2004. “Divine Commands Are the Foundation of Morality.” In M. L. Peterson & R. J. VanArragon (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Blackwell. 290–98.
• Johnson, J. L. 1994. “Procedure, Substance, and the Divine Command Theory.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 35. 39–55.
• Kretzmann, N. 1983. “Abraham, Isaac, and Euthyphro: God and the Basis of Morality.” In D. V. Stump, et al. (eds.) Hamartia: The Concept of Error in the Western Tradition. New York: Edwin Mellen. 27–50.
• Maitzen, S. 2004. “A Semantic Attack on Divine-Command Metaethics.” Sophia. 43. 15–28.
• Mawson, T. J. 2002. “God’s Creation of Morality.” Religious Studies. 38. 1–25.
• Mawson, T. J. 2008. “The Euthyphro Dilemma.” Think. 20. 25–33.
• Mavrodes, G. 1986. “Religion and the Queerness of Morality.” In R. Audi & W. Wainwright (eds). Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 213–26.
• Morriston, W. 2001. “Must There Be a Standard of Moral Goodness Apart from God?” Philosophia Christi. 3. 127–38.
• Morriston, W. 2009. “What If God Commanded Something Terrible? A Worry for Divine-Command Meta-Ethics.” Religious Studies. 45. 249–67.
• Morriston, W. 2009. “The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers: A Special Problem for Divine Command Metaethics.” International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion. 65. 1–10.
• Murphy, M. C. 1998. “Divine Command, Divine Will, and Moral Obligation.” Faith and Philosophy. 15. 3–27.
• Murphy, M. C. 2002. “A Trilemma for Divine Command Theory.” Faith and Philosophy. 19. 22–31.
• Murphy, M. C. 2002. An Essay on Divine Authority. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
• Murphy, M. C. 2005. “Reply to Almeida.” Religious Studies. 40. 335–39.
• Nielsen, K. 1982. “God and the Basis of Morality.” Journal of Religious Ethics. 10. 335–50.
• Quinn, P. 1975. “Religious Obedience and Moral Autonomy.” Religious Studies. 11. 265–82.
• Quinn, P. 1978. Divine Commands and Moral Requirements. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Quinn, P. 1979. “Divine Command Ethics: A Causal Theory.” In J. Idziak (ed.) Divine Command Morality: Historical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Edwin Mellen. 305–25.
• • [Reprint] Quinn, P. 1979. “Divine Command Ethics: A Causal Theory.” In his Essays in the Philosophy of Religion. 2006. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 37–52.
• Quinn, P. 1990. “An Argument for Divine Command Ethics.” In M. Beaty (ed.) Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 289–302.
• Quinn, P. 1992. “The Primacy of God’s Will in Christian Ethics.” Philosophical Perspectives. 6. 493–513.
• • [Reprint] Quinn, P. 1992. “The Primacy of God’s Will in Christian Ethics.” In his Essays in the Philosophy of Religion. 2006. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 53–76.
• Quinn, P. 1999. “Divine Command Theory.” In H. LaFollette (ed.) Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. 53–73.
• Quinn, P. 2001. “Theological Ethics.” In L. C. Becker & C. B. Becker (eds.) Encyclopedia of Ethics. London: Routledge. 1702–06.
• Quinn, P. 2002. “Obligation, Divine Commands and Abraham’s Dilemma” (Symposium on Robert M. Adams’s Finite and Infinite Goods). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 64. 459–66.
• Quinn, P. 2005. “Theological Voluntarism.” In D. Copp (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 63–90.
• Quinn, P. 2005. “Divine Command Theories of Ethics.” In D. M. Borchert (ed.) Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA. Volume 3, 93–94.
• Quinn, P. 2006. Essays in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Rae, M. “Naturalism and Moral Realism.” In T. M. Crisp, M. Davidson, & D. Vander Laan (eds.) Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga (Philosophical Studies Series). Dordrecht: Springer. 215–41.
• Rachels, J. 1971. “God and Human Attitudes.” Religious Studies. 7. 325–37.
• • [Reprint] Rachels, J. 1971. “God and Human Attitudes.” In P. Helm (ed.) Divine Commands and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1981. 34–48.
• Rogers, K. 2005. “God and Moral Realism.” International Philosophical Quarterly. 45. 103–18.
• Sagi, A. & D. Statman. 1995. “Divine Command Morality and Jewish Tradition.” Journal of Religious Ethics. 23. 39–67.
• Sagi, A. & D. Statman. 1995. Religion and Morality. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
• Schroeder, M. 2005. “Cudworth and Normative Explanations.” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. 1. 1–27.
• Shaw, J. 2002. “Divine Commands at the Foundations of Morality.” Journal of Canadian Philosophy. 32. 419–40.
• Sullivan, S. J. 1993. “Arbitrariness, Divine Commands, and Morality.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 33. 33–45.
• Sullivan, S. J. 1993. “Robert Adams’s Theistic Argument from the Nature of Morality.” Journal of Religious Ethics. 21. 303–12.
• Sullivan, S. J. 1994. “Why Adams Needs to Modify His Divine-Command Theory One More Time.” Faith and Philosophy. 11. 72–81.
• Swan, K. 2004. “Copping Out on the Anything-Goes Objection.” Philosophia Christi. 6. 289–94.
• Swan, K. 2006. “A Metaethical Option for Theists.” Journal of Religious Ethics. 34. 3–20.
• Talbott, T. B. 1982. “Quinn on Divine Commands and Moral Requirements.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 13. 193–208.
• Wainwright, W. J. 2005. Religion and Morality. Aldershot: Ashgate.
• Westmoreland, R. 1996. “Two Recent Metaphysical Divine Command Theories of Ethics.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 39. 15–31.
• Wierenga, E. 1983. “A Defensible Divine Command Theory.” Noûs. 17. 387–407.
• Wierenga, E. 1989. The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
• Zagzebski, L. 1987. “Does Ethics Need God?” Faith and Philosophy. 4. 294–303.
• Zagzebski, L. 1997. “Perfect Goodness and Divine Motivation Theory.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy. 21. 296–309.
• Zagzebski, L. 1998. “The Virtues of God and the Foundations of Ethics.” Faith and Philosophy. 15. 538–52.
• Zagzebski, L. 2002. “Obligation, Good Motives, and the Good” (Symposium on Robert M. Adams’s Finite and Infinite Goods). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 64. 453–58.
• Zagzebski, L. 2004. Divine Motivation Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Zagzebski, L. 2004. “Morality and Religion.” In W. J. Wainwright (ed.) Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 344–65.
• Zagzebski, L. 2005. “More Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists.” In H. D. Battaly & M. P. Lynch (eds.) Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 185–201.

Response-Dependence and Idealization

Philosophers who have defended response-dependence and idealization views:

• Roderick Firth:
• Michael Smith:
• Mark Johnston:
• Richard Brandt:

Bibliography of philosophical work on response-dependence and idealization views:

• Bigelow, J. & M. Smith. 1997. “How not to be Muddled by a Meddlesome Muggletonian.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 75. 511–27.
• Brandt, R. 1979. A Theory of the Good and the Right. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Brandt, R. 1985. “The Explanation of Moral Language.” In D. Copp & D. Zimmerman (eds.) Morality, Reason, and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld. 104–19.
• Brandt, R. 1996. Facts, Values, and Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Firth, R. 1952. “Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 12. 317–45.
• • [Reprint] Firth, R. 1952. “Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 107–19.
• Firth, R. 1954. “Reply to Professor Brandt.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 12. 414–21.
• Holland, S. 2001. “Dispositional Theories of Value Meet Moral Twin Earth.” American Philosophical Quarterly. 38. 177–95.
• Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 1996. “Troubles for Michael Smith’s Metaethical Rationalism.” Philosophical Papers. 25. 203–31.
• Johnston, M. 1989. “Dispositional Theories of Value.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 63 (Supplement). 139–74.
• Johnston, M. 1991. “Explanation, Response-Dependence and Judgement-Dependence.” In P. Menzies (ed.), Response-Dependent Concepts. Working Papers in Philosophy: Philosophy Program (RSSS), Australian National University. 122–83.
• Johnston, M. 1992. “How to Speak of the Colors.” Philosophical Studies. 68. 221–63.
• Johnston, M. 1993. “Objectivity Refigured: Pragmatism without Verificationism.” In J. Haldane and C. Wright (eds.) Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 85–130.
• Lewis, D. 1989. “Dispositional Theories of Value.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 63 (Supplement). 113–37.
• Pettit, P. 1991. “Realism and Response-Dependence.” Mind. 100. 587–626.
• Smith, M. 1989. “Dispositional Theories of Value.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 63 (Supplement). 89–111.
• Smith, M. 1991. “Realism.” In P. Singer (ed.) Companion to Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. 399–410.
• • [Reprint (shortened)] Smith, M. 1991. “Realism.” In P. Singer (ed.) Ethics: The Oxford Reader. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 170–76.
  • [Reprint] Smith, M. 1991. “Realism.” In R. Shafer-Landau (ed.) Ethical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. ??–??.
• Smith, M. 1992. “Valuing: Desiring or Believing?” In D. Charles & K. Lennon (eds.) Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 323–60.
• Smith, M. 1993. “Objectivity and Moral Realism: On the Significance of the Phenomenology of Moral Experience.” In J. Haldane and C. Wright (eds.) Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 235–55.
• Smith, M. 1994. The Moral Problem. Oxford: Blackwell.
• • [Excerpt] Smith, M. 1994. “The Externalist Challenge.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) 2006. Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 529–46??
  • [Excerpt] Smith, M. 1994. “The Externalist Challenge.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 231–42.
• Smith, M. 1995. “Introduction.” In his (ed.) Meta-Ethics. Aldershot: Dartmouth. xiii–xxi.
• Smith, M. 1995. “Internalism’s Wheel.” Ratio. 8. 277–302.
• • [Reprint] Smith, M. 1995. “Internalism’s Wheel.” In B. Hooker (ed.) Truth in Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. 1996. 69–94.
  • [Reprint] Smith, M. 1995. “Internalism’s Wheel.” In his (ed.) Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2004. 318–42.
• Smith, M. 1995. “Reply to Ingmar Persson’s Critical Notice of The Moral Problem.” Theoria. 61. 1995. 159–81.
• Smith, M. 1996. “Normative Reasons and Full Rationality: Reply to Swanton” Analysis. 56. 160–68.
• Smith, M. 1996. “The Argument for Internalism: Reply to Miller” Analysis. 56. 175–84.
• Smith, M. 1997. “In Defence of The Moral Problem: A Reply to Brink, Copp and Sayre-McCord” (Symposium on his The Moral Problem). Ethics. 108. 84–119.
• • [Reprint] Smith, M. 1997. “In Defence of The Moral Problem: A Reply to Brink, Copp and Sayre-McCord.” In his Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2004. 259–96.
• Smith, M. 1998. “Response-Dependence Without Reduction.” In R. Casati & C. Tappolet (eds.) European Review of Philosophy, volume 3: Response-Dependence. Stanford: CSLI Publications. 85–108.
• Smith, M. 1998. “Ethics and the A Priori: A Modern Parable.” Philosophical Studies (Special Issue on the A Priori, edited by J. Hawthorne). 92. 149–174.
• • [Reprint] Smith, M. 1998. “Ethics and the A Priori: A Modern Parable.” In his Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2004. ??–??.
• Smith, M. 1999. “The Definition of ‘Moral’” In D. Jamieson (ed.) Singer and His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell. 38–63.
• Smith, M. 1999. “The Non-Arbitrariness of Reasons: Reply to Lenman” Utilitas. 11. 178–93.
• Smith, M. 2000. “Does the Evaluative Supervene on the Natural?” In R. Crisp & B. Hooker (eds.) Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 91–114.
• • [Reprint] Smith, M. 1998. “Ethics and the A Priori: A Modern Parable.” In his Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2004. ??–??.
• Smith, M. 2000. “Moral Realism.” In H. LaFollette (ed.) Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. 15–37.
• • [Reprint] Smith, M. 1998. “Moral Realism.” In his Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2004. ??–??.
• Smith, M. 2001. “Normative Skepticism.” Dialogue. 20. 25–30.
• Smith, M. 2001. “Some Not-Much-Discussed Problems for Non-Cognitivism in Ethics.” Ratio. 14. 93–115.
• Smith, M. 2001. “The Incoherence Argument: Reply to Schafer-Landau.” Analysis. 61. 254–66.
• • [Reprint] Smith, M. 1998. “The Incoherence Argument: Reply to Schafer-Landau.” In his Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2004. ??–??.
• Smith, M. 2002. “Exploring the Implications of the Dispositional Theory of Value.” Philosophical Issues (Realism and Relativism). 12. 329–47.
• • [Reprint] Smith, M. 1998. “Exploring the Implications of the Dispositional Theory of Value.” In his Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2004. ??–??.
• Smith, M. 2002. “Evaluation, Uncertainty, and Motivation.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 5. 305–20.
• • [Reprint] Smith, M. 1998. “Evaluation, Uncertainty, and Motivation.” In his Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2004. ??–??.
• Smith, M. 2003. “Humeanism, Psychologism, and the Normative Story.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 67. 460–67.
• • [Reprint] Smith, M. 1998. “Humeanism, Psychologism, and the Normative Story.” In his Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2004. ??–??.
• Smith, M. 2005. “Metaethics.” In F. Jackson & M. Smith (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3–30.
• Smith, M. 2007. “Precis of Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics.” Philosophical Books. 48. 97–98.
• Smith, M. 2007. “In Defense of Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics: Reply to Enoch, Heironymi, and Tannenbaum.” Philosophical Books. 48. 136–49.
• Smith, M. 2007. “Is there a Nexus between Reasons and Rationality?” In S. Tenenbaum (ed.) Moral Psychology. Amsterdam: Rodopi. 279–98.
• Smith, M. 2008. “The Truth About Internalism” In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) Moral Psychology, Volume 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development. New York: Oxford University Press. 207–15.
• Smith, M. 2009. “The Explanatory Role of Being Rational.” In D. Sobel & S. Wall (eds.) Reasons for Action. New York: Cambridge University Press. 58–80.
• Smith, M. 2009. “Desires, Values, Reasons, and the Dualism of Practical Reason” Ratio (Special Issue: Parfit’s On What Matters, edited by J. Cottingham and J. Suikkanen). 22. 98–125.
• Smith, M. 2009. “Reasons With Rationalism After All” Analysis Reviews. 69. 1–10.
• Smith, M. 2010. “Beyond the Error Theory.” In R. Joyce & S. Kirchin (eds.) A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory. New York: Springer. 119–39.
• Zimmerman, D. 2003. “Why Richard Brandt Does Not Need Cognitive Psychotherapy, and Other Glad News about Idealized Preference Theories in Meta-Ethics.” Journal of Value Inquiry. 37. 373–94.

Sensibility Theory

Philosophers who have defended sensibility theory:

• John McDowell:
• David Wiggins:
• Sabina Lovibond:
• Mark Platts:
• David McNaughton?:

Bibliography of philosophical work on sensibility theory:

• Holland, S. 2001. “Dispositional Theories of Value Meet Moral Twin Earth.” American Philosophical Quarterly. 38. 177–95.
• Lovibond, S. 1983. Realism and Imagination in Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.
• Lovibond, S. 1997. “Ethical Upbringing: From Connivance to Cognition.” In S. Lovibond & B. Williams (eds.) Identity, Truth and Value. Oxford: Blackwell. 76–95.
• Lovibond, S. 2002. Ethical Formation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• McDowell, J. 1978. “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 52 (Supplement). 13–29.
• McDowell, J. 1981. “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following.” In S. Holtzman and C. M. Leich (eds.) Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 141–62.
• • [Reprint] McDowell, J. 1981. “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 2006. 453–69.
• McDowell, J. 1985. “Values and Secondary Qualities.” In T. Honderich (ed.) Morality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J. L. Mackie. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 110–29.
• • [Reprint] McDowell, J. 1985. “Values and Secondary Qualities.” In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.) Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1988. 166–80.
  • [Reprint] McDowell, J. 1985. “Values and Secondary Qualities.” In his Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1998. 131–50.
  • [Reprint] McDowell, J. 1985. “Values and Secondary Qualities.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 2006. 225–40.
  • [Reprint] McDowell, J. 1985. “Values and Secondary Qualities.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 137–44.
• McDowell, J. 1987. “Projection and Truth in Ethics.” The Lindley Lecture. University of Kansas Press.
  • [Reprint] McDowell, J. 1987. “Projection and Truth in Ethics.” In his Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1998. 151–66.
  • [Reprint] McDowell, J. 1987. “Projection and Truth in Ethics.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 2006. 489–502.
• Platts, M. 1979. “Moral Reality.” In his Ways of Meaning. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ??–??.
• • [Reprint] Platts, M. 1979. “Moral Reality.” In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.) Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1988. 282–300.
• Wiggins, D. 1976. “Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life.” Proceedings of the British Academy. 62. 331–78.
• • [Reprint] Wiggins, D. 1976. “Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life.” In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.) Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1988. 127–65.
• Wiggins, D. 1987. “A Sensible Subjectivism?” In his Needs, Values and Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value. Oxford: Blackwell. 185–214.
• • [Reprint] Wiggins, D. 1987. “A Sensible Subjectivism?” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 145–156.
• Wiggins, D. 1987. “Truth and Truth as Predicate of Moral Judgments” In his Needs, Values and Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value. Oxford: Blackwell. 139–84.
• Wiggins, D. 1990–91. “Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism, and Motivating Moral Beliefs.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 91. 61–85.
• Wiggins, D. 1992. “Ayer on Morality and Feeling: From Subjectivism to Emotivism and Back Again.” In H. Hahn (ed.) The Philosophy of A. J. Ayer. La Salle, IL: Open Court. 633–60.
• Wiggins, D. 1992. “Ayer’s Ethical Theory: Emotivism or Subjectivism?” In A. Phillips-Griffiths (ed.) A. J. Ayer: Memorial Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 181–96.
• • This is excerpted from “Ayer on Morality and Feeling: From Subjectivism to Emotivism and Back Again.”
• Wiggins, D. 1993. “Cognitivism, Naturalism, and Normativity.” In J. Haldane and C. Wright (eds.) Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 301–14.
• Wiggins, D. 1993. “A Neglected Position?” In J. Haldane and C. Wright (eds.) Reality, Representation and Projection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 329–38.
• Wiggins, D. 1995. “Objective and Subjective in Ethics, with Two Postscripts about Truth.” Ratio. 8. 243–58.
• • [Reprint] Wiggins, D. 1995. “Objective and Subjective in Ethics, with Two Postscripts about Truth.” In B. Hooker (ed.) Truth in Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. 1996. 35–50.

Kantian Constructivism and Constitutivism

Philosophers who have defended Kantian constructivism and constitutivism:

• John Rawls:
• Christine Korsgaard:
• David Velleman:
• Connie Rosati?:
• Stephen Darwall?:

Bibliography of philosophical work on Kantian constructivism and constitutivism:

• Gibbard, A. 1999. “Morality as Consistency in Living: Korsgaard’s Kantian Lectures.” Ethics. 110. 140–164.
• Korsgaard, C. 1986. “Skepticism about Practical Reason.” Journal of Philosophy. 83. 5–25.
• • [Reprint] Korsgaard, C. 1986. “Skepticism about Practical Reason.” In S. Darwall, A. Gibbard, & P. Railton (eds.) Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1995. 373–87.
  • [Reprint] Korsgaard, C. 1986. “Skepticism about Practical Reason.” In her Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996. ??–??.
  • [Reprint] Korsgaard, C. 1986. “Skepticism about Practical Reason.” In E. Millgram (ed.) Varieties of Practical Reasoning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2001. ??–??
  • [Reprint] Korsgaard, C. 1986. “Skepticism about Practical Reason.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. ??–??.
• Korsgaard, C. 1996. The Sources of Normativity. New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Korsgaard, C. 1997. “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason.” In G. Cullity & B. Gaut (eds.) Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 215–54.
• • [Reprint] Korsgaard, C. 1997. “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason.” In her The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2008. ??–??.
• Korsgaard, C. 1999. “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant.” Journal of Ethics. 3. 1–29.
• • [Reprint] Korsgaard, C. 1999. “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant.” In her The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2008. ??–??.
• Korsgaard, C. 2008. The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Korsgaard, C. 2009. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Rawls, J. 1980. “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory.” The Journal of Philosophy. 77. 515–72.
• • [Reprint] Rawls, J. 1980. “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory.” In his Collected Papers, edited by S. Freeman. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1999. 303–58.
• Rosati, C. 1995. “Naturalism, Normativity, and the Open Question Argument.” Noûs. 29. 46–70.
• Rosati, C. 1995. “Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good.” Ethics. 105. 296–325.
• Rosati, C. 1996. “Internalism and the Good for a Person.” Ethics. 106. 297–326.
• Rosati, C. 2000. “Brandt’s Notion of Therapeutic Agency.” Ethics. 110. 780–811.
• Rosati, C. 2003. “Agency and the Open Question Argument.” Ethics. 113. 490–527.
• Velleman, J. D. 1989. Practical Reflection. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Velleman, J. D. 1992. “The Guise of the Good.” Noûs. 26. 3–26.
• • [Reprint] Velleman, J. D. 1992. “The Guise of the Good.” In his The Possibility of Practical Reason. New York: Oxford University Press. 2000. 99–122.
• Velleman, J. D. 1996. “The Possibility of Practical Reason.” Ethics. 106. 694–726.
• • [Reprint] Velleman, J. D. 1996. “The Possibility of Practical Reason.” In his The Possibility of Practical Reason. New York: Oxford University Press. 2000. 170–99.
• Velleman, J. D. 1997. “Deciding how to Decide.” In G. Cullity & B. Gaut (eds.) Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 29–52.
• • [Reprint] Velleman, J. D. 1997. “Deciding how to Decide.” In his The Possibility of Practical Reason. New York: Oxford University Press. 2000. 221–43.
• Velleman, J. D. 1998. “Is Motivation Internal to Value?” In G. Meggle, C. Fehige, & U. Wessels (eds.) Preferences. Berlin: de Gruyter. 88–102.
• • [Reprint] Velleman, J. D. 1998. “Is Motivation Internal to Value?” In his The Possibility of Practical Reason. New York: Oxford University Press. 2000. 85–98.
• Velleman, J. D. 1998. “Brandt’s Defnition of ‘Good’.” Philosophical Review. 97. 353–71.
• Velleman, J. D. 2000. The Possibility of Practical Reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Velleman, J. D. 2000. “On the Aim of Belief.” In The Possibility of Practical Reason. New York: Oxford University Press. 244–81.
• Velleman, J. D. 2000. “From Self Psychology to Moral Philosophy.” Philosophical Perspectives. 14. 349–77.
• • [Reprint] Velleman, J. D. 2000. “From Self Psychology to Moral Philosophy.” In his Self to Self: Selected Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2006. 224–52.
• Velleman, J. D. 2004. “Précis of The Possibility of Practical Reason.” Philosophical Studies. 121. 225–38.
• Velleman, J. D. 2004. “Replies to Discussion of The Possibility of Practical Reason.” Philosophical Studies. 121. 277–98.
• Velleman, J. D. 2006. Self to Self: Selected Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• • [Book Chapter] Velleman, J. D. 2006. “A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics.” In his Self to Self: Selected Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • [Book Chapter]
  • [Book Chapter] Velleman, J. D. 2006. “The Centered Self.” In his Self to Self: Selected Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Humean Constructivism

Philosophers who have defended Humean constructivism:

• Sharon Street:
• Valerie Tiberius:
• Dale Dorsey:

Bibliography of philosophical work on Humean constructivism:

Hobbesian Contractarianism

Philosophers who have defended Hobbesian contractarianism:

• David Gauthier:
• Jan Narveson:

Bibliography of philosophical work on Hobbesian contractarianism:

Error-Theory
According to error-theory, there are no objective moral facts, and since moral evaluation presupposes objective moral facts, therefore moral evaluation is based on a mistaken presupposition. Error-theorists thus agree with realists about the metaphysical commitments inherent in moral evaluation but then deny that those commitments are actually true—which in turn keeps moral judgments from ever being true. The most prominent error-theorist by far is J. L. Mackie, whose Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong brought the view to widespread attention and notoriety. Different error-theorists disagree about whether moral evaluation should be abandoned wholesale or instead preserved (perhaps in some modified form). Mackie himself seemed unwilling to abandon morality, and Richard Joyce has recently defended “revisionary fictionalism” as a satisfactory replacement for our error-ridden moral practices. Metaethical error-theory can be compared to error-theories elsewhere in philosophy (e.g., the metaphysics of color, philosophy of mathematics) and atheism in the philosophy of religion. Also known as: moral nihilism, moral skepticism, and anethicism.

Philosophers who have defended error-theory:

• J. L. Mackie:
• Richard Joyce:
• John P. Burgess:
• Richard T. Garner:
• Stephen Schiffer:
• Jonas Olson:
• Jordan Sobel:
• Hallvard Lillehammer:
• Matt Bedke:
• Don Loeb:
• Ian Hinckfuss:
• Chris Daly & David Liggins:
• Simon Robertson:
• Charles Pigden:
• Bart Streumer:
• Richard Robinson??:

Bibliography of philosophical work on error-theory:

• Bedke, M. 2010. “Might All Normativity Be Queer?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 88. 41–58.
• Burgess, J. P. [1978] 2007. “Against Ethics.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 10. 427–39.
• Daly, C. & D. Liggins. 2010. “In Defence of Error Theory.” Philosophical Studies. 149. 209–30.
• Garner, R. T. 1990. “On the Genuine Queerness of Moral Properties and Facts.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 68: 137–146.
• • [Reprint] Garner, R. T. 1990. “On the Genuine Queerness of Moral Properties and Facts.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 2006. 96–107.
• Garner, R. T. 1993. “Are Convenient Fictions Harmful to Your Health?” Philosophy East and West. 43. 87–106.
• Garner, R. T. 1994. Beyond Morality. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
• Hinckfuss, I. 1987. “The Moral Society: Its Structure and Effects.” Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy. 16. Philosophy Program (RSSS), Australian National University.
• Joyce, R. 2001. The Myth of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• • [Excerpt] Joyce, R. 2001. “The Myth of Morality.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 23–34.
• Joyce, R. 2006. The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Joyce, R. & S. Kirchin (eds.). 2010. A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory. New York: Springer.
• Lillehammer, H. 2003. “Debunking Morality: Evolutionary Naturalism and Moral Error Theory.” Biology and Philosophy. 18. 567–81.
• Lillehammer, H. 2004. “Moral Error Theory.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 104. 93–109.
• Loeb, D. 1996. “Must a Moral Irrealist be a Pragmatist?” American Philosophical Quarterly. 33. 225–33.
• Loeb, D. 1998. “Moral Realism and the Argument from Disagreement.” Philosophical Studies. 90: 281–303.
• Loeb, D. 2007. “The Argument from Moral Experience.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 10. 469–84.
• Mackie, J. L. 1946. “A Refutation of Morals.” Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy. 24. 77–90.
• Mackie, J. L. 1976. Problems from Locke. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin Books.
• • [Excerpt] Mackie, J. L. 1977. “The Subjectivity of Values.” In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.) Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1988. 95–118.
  • [Excerpt] Mackie, J. L. 1977. “The Arguments from Relativity and Queerness.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 2006. 75–9.
  • [Excerpt] Mackie, J. L. 1977. “The Subjectivity of Values.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 13–22.
• Mackie, J. L. 1980. Hume’s Moral Theory. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
• Mackie, J. L. 1982. The Miracle of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Schiffer, S. 1990. “Meaning and Value.” The Journal of Philosophy. 87. 602–14.
• Schiffer, S. 2002. “Moral Realism and Indeterminacy.” Philosophical Issues. 12. 286–304.
• Robertson, S. 2008. “How to Be an Error Theorist about Morality.” Polish Journal of Philosophy. 2. 107–25.
• Robinson, R. 1948. “The Emotive Theory of Ethics” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 22 (Supplement). 79–140.
• Streumer, B. 20??. “Are Normative Properties Descriptive Properties?” Philosophical Studies.

Expressivism

Expressivism is the view that moral judgments express practical attitudes and perform practical speech acts—emotions, feelings, prescriptions, commitments, sentiments, acceptances of norms—instead of expressing ordinary descriptive beliefs and assertions about some moral reality. Since moral evaluation is not a matter of factual description, but instead practical evaluation of the ordinary natural world, then metaphysical questions of moral properties and their place in the world are rendered moot. Expressivism has been both condemned as a debunking of moral objectivity and defended as a framework for understanding moral objectivity. Also known as: non-cognitivism, non-factualism, projectivism.

See Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism (SEP), Non-Cognitivism in Ethics (IEP), and Ethical Expressivism (IEP).

Philosophers who have defended expressivism:

Bibliography of philosophical work on expressivism:

Emotivism

Philosophers who have defended emotivism:

• A. J. Ayer:
• Charles L. Stevenson:
• C. K. Ogden & I. A. Richards:
• Winston H. F. Barnes:
• Axel Hägerström:
• Rudolf Carnap:
• Austin Duncan-Jones:
• Patrick Nowell-Smith?:
• Stuart Hampshire?:
• J? Ladd?:
• P. B. Rice?:
• J. O. Urmson?:
• Popper?:
• Falk?:

Bibliography of philosophical work on emotivism:

• Ayer, A. J. 1936. Language, Truth and Logic. London: Gollancz.
• • [Excerpt] Ayer, A. J. 1936. “Critique of Ethics and Theology.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 40–6.
• Ayer, A. J. 1949. “On the Analysis of Moral Judgements.” Horizon. 20. 171–84.
• • [Reprint] Ayer, A. J. 1949. “On the Analysis of Moral Judgements.” In his Philosophical Essays. 1954. London: Macmillan. 231–49.
• Ayer, A. J. 1984. “Are There Objective Values?” In his Freedom and Morality and Other Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 17–34.
• Baier, K. 1967. “Fact, Value, and Norm in Stevenson’s Ethics.” Noûs. 1. 139–60.
• Barnes, W. H. F. 1933. “A Suggestion about Value.” Analysis. 1. 45–6.
• Barnes, W. H. F. 1948. “Ethics Without Propositions.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 22 (Supplement). 1–30.
• Carnap, R. 1935. Philosophy and Logical Syntax. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.
• Carnap, R. 1963. “Replies and Expositions.” In P. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. LaSalle, IL: Open Court. 859–1013.
• Hägerström, A. 1911. “Om moraliska föreställningars sanning.” In his Socialfilosofiska uppsatser. Stockholm: Bonniers. 1939. 37–65.
• • [Revised version] Hägerström, A. 1911. “Om moraliska föreställningars sanning.” In his Socialfilosofiska uppsatser, 2nd edition. Stockholm: Bonniers. 1961. 35–57.
  • [Revised version] Hägerström, A. 1911. “Om moraliska föreställningars sanning.” In his Moralfilosofins grundläggning, edited by T. Mautner. Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell International. 1987. 27–50.
  • [Translation] Hägerström, A. 1911. “On the Truth of Moral Propositions.” In his Philosophy and Religion, translated by R. Sandin. London: Allen & Unwin. 1964. 77–96.
  • [Translation] Hägerström, A. 1911. On the Truth of Moral Ideas, translated by T. Mautner. Canberra: Philosophy Department, Australian National University. 1971.
• Nowell-Smith, P. H. 1954. Ethics. Baltimore: Penguin Books.
• Ogden, C. K. & I. A. Richards. 1923. The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism. New York: Harcourt and Brace.
• Richards, I. A. 1948. “Emotive Meaning Again.” Philosophical Review. 57. 145–57.
• Stevenson, C. L. ??? on Moore in Schilpp??
• Stevenson, C. L. 1937. “The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms.” Mind. 46. 14–31.
• Stevenson, C. L. 1937. “Persuasive Definitions.” Mind. 47. 331–50.
• Stevenson, C. L. 1944. Ethics and Language. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
• Stevenson, C. L. 1948. “Meaning: Descriptive and Emotive.” Philosophical Review. 57. 127–44.
• Stevenson, C. L. 1949. “The Nature of Ethical Disagreement.” In H. Feigl & W. Sellars (eds.) Readings in Philosophical Analysis. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 587–93.
• • [Reprint] Stevenson, C. L. 1949. “The Nature of Ethical Disagreement.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 371–75.
• Stevenson, C. L. 1950. “The Emotive Conception of Ethics and its Cognitive Implications.” Philosophical Review. 59. 291–304.
• Stevenson, C. L. 1950. “Brandt’s Questions about Emotive Ethics.” Philosophical Review. 59. 528–34.
• Stevenson, C. L. 1961–62. “Relativism and Non-Relativism in the Theory of Value.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. 35. 25–44.
• • [Reprint] Stevenson, C. L. 1961–62. “Relativism and Non-Relativism in the Theory of Value.” In his Facts and Values. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1963. 71–93.
• Stevenson, C. L. 1963. Facts and Values: Studies in Ethical Analysis. New Haven: Yale University Press.
• Stevenson, C. L. 1966. “Ethical Fallibility.” In R. T. DeGeorge (ed.) Ethics and Society. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
• Stevenson, C. L. 1973. “Richards on the Theory of Value.” In R. Brower, H. Vendler, & J. Hollander (eds.) I. A. Richards: Essays in His Honour. London: Oxford University Press.
• Stevenson, C. L. 1983. “Value-Judgments: Their Implicit Generality.” In N. E. Bowie (ed.) Ethical Theory in the Last Quarter of the Twentieth Century. Indianapolis: Hackett. 13–37.
• Urmson, J. O. 1968. The Emotive Theory of Ethics. London: Hutchinson.
• Wellman, C. 1968. “Emotivism and Ethical Objectivity.” American Philosophical Quarterly. 5. ??–??.
• Wood, L. 1937. “Cognition and Moral Value.” Journal of Philosophy. 34. 234–39.

Prescriptivism

Philosophers who have defended prescriptivism:

• R. M. Hare:
• J. J. C. Smart:
• R. C. Cross?:

Bibliography of philosophical work on prescriptivism:

• Hare, R. M. 1952. The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Hare, R. M. 1970. “Meaning and Speech Acts.” Philosophical Review. 79. 3–24.
• Hare, R. M. 1985. “Ontology in Ethics.” In T. Honderich (ed.) Morality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J. L. Mackie. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ??–??.
• Smart, J. J. C. 1950. “Reason and Conduct.” Philosophy. 25. 209–24.
• Smart, J. J. C. 1981. “Ethics and Science.” Philosophy. 56. 449–65.
• Smart, J. J. C. 1982. “Prior and the Basis of Ethics.” Synthese. 53. 3–17.
• Smart, J. J. C. 1982. “Why Moral Language?” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung. 36. 153–68.
• Smart, J. J. C. 1984. Ethics, Persuasion and Truth. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
• Smart, J. J. C. 1990. “Review: Value, Truth, and Action.” Ethics. 100. 628–40.

Quasi-Realist Expressivism
Quasi-realist expressivists aim to reconcile the anti-realist metaphysics of expressivism with a thoroughgoing commitment to moral objectivity. Just as expressivists understand first-order moral evaluation (e.g., “Genocide is wrong”) in terms of attitudes we hold rather than descriptive beliefs, quasi-realists use minimalist theories of truth (and similar theories) to understand any second-order claims to objectivity (e.g., “It is an objective fact that genocide is wrong”) in terms of attitudes we hold (often higher-order attitudes) rather than descriptive beliefs about realist metaphysics.

Philosophers who have defended quasi-realist expressivism:

• Simon Blackburn:
• Allan Gibbard:
• Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons:
• Jamie Dreier:
• Jimmy Lenman:
• Gunnar Björnsson:
• Huw Price:
• Hartry Field:
• Neil Sinclair:
• Wayne Fenske:
• Tito Magri?:
• Robert Mabrito?:
• Michael Pendlebury:

Bibliography of philosophical work on quasi-realist expressivism:

• Alm, D. 2000. “Moral Conditionals, Non-Cognitivism and Meaning.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 38. 355–77.
• Baker, C. 2011??. “Expressivism and Moral Dilemmas: A Response to Marino.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 9. 517–33.
• Barker, S. J. 2002. “Troubles with Horgan and Timmons’ Nondescriptivist Cognitivism.” Grazer Philosophische Studien. 63. 235–55.
• Barker, S. J. 2006. “Truth and the Expressing in Expressivism.” In T. Horgan & M. Timmons (eds.) Metaethics after Moore. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ??–??.
• Björnsson, G. 2001. “Why Emotivists Love Inconsistency.” Philosophical Studies. 104. 81–108.
• Björnsson, G. 2002. “How Emotivism Survives Immoralists, Irrationality, and Depression.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 60. 327–44.
• Blackburn, S. 1971. “Moral Realism.” In J. Casey (ed.) Morality and Moral Reasoning. London: Methuen. 101–24.
• • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1971. “Moral Realism.” In his Essays in Quasi-Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. 111–29.
• Blackburn, S. 1980. “Truth, Realism, and the Regulation of Theory.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy. 5. 353–71.
• • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1980. “Truth, Realism, and the Regulation of Theory.” In his Essays in Quasi-Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. 15–34.
• Blackburn, S. 1981. “Reply: Rule-Following and Moral Realism.” In S. Holtzman & C. M. Leich (eds.) Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 163–87.
• • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1981. “Reply: Rule-Following and Moral Realism.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 2006. 470–88.
• Blackburn, S. 1984. Spreading the Word. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• • [Excerpt] Blackburn, S. 1984. “Realism and Variations.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) 2006. Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 295–315.
  • [Excerpt] Blackburn, S. 1984. “The Frege-Geach Problem.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) 2006. Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 349–59??
• Blackburn, S. 1985. “Supervenience Revisited.” In I. Hacking (ed.) Exercises in Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 47–67.
• • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1985. “Supervenience Revisited.” In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.) Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1988. 59–75.
  • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1985. “Supervenience Revisited (with Addendum).” In his Essays in Quasi-Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. 130–145.
  • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1985. “Supervenience Revisited” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 438–48.
• Blackburn, S. 1985. “Errors and the Phenomenology of Value.” In T. Honderich (ed.) Morality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J. L. Mackie. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1–22.
• • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1985. “Errors and the Phenomenology of Value.” In his Essays in Quasi-Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. 149–65.
• Blackburn, S. 1986. “Morals and Modals.” In G. MacDonald & C. Wright (eds.) Truth, Fact, and Value. Oxford: Blackwell. 119–41.
• • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1986. “Morals and Modals.” In his Essays in Quasi-Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. 52–74.
  • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1986. “Morals and Modals.” In J. Kim & E. Sosa (eds.) Metaphysics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 1999. 634–48.
• Blackburn, S. 1988. “Attitudes and Contents.” Ethics. 98. 501–17.
• • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1988. “Attitudes and Contents.” In his Essays in Quasi-Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. 182–97.
  • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1988. “Attitudes and Contents.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) 2006. Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 369–85??
  • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1988. “Attitudes and Contents.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 474–84.
• Blackburn, S. 1988. “How to Be an Ethical Anti-Realist.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy. 12. 361–75.
• • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1988. “How to Be an Ethical Anti-Realist.” In his Essays in Quasi-Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. 166–81.
  • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1988. “How to Be an Ethical Anti-Realist.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 47–57.
• Blackburn, S. 1992. “Wise Feelings, Apt Reading.” Ethics. 102. 342–56.
• Blackburn, S. 1992. “Morality and Thick Concepts II: Through Thick and Thin.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 66 (Supplement). 285–99.
• Blackburn, S. 1993. Essays in Quasi-Realism. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Blackburn, S. 1993. “Realism, Quasi, or Queasy?” In J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.) Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 365–83.
• Blackburn, S. 1993. “Circles, Finks, Smells, and Biconditionals.” Philosophical Perspectives. 7. 259–79.
• Blackburn, S. 1993. “Gibbard on Normative Logic.” Philosophical Issues. 4. 60–66.
• Blackburn, S. 1995. “Practical Tortoise Raising.” Mind. 104. 695–711.
• Blackburn, S. 1995. “The Flight to Reality.” In R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, & W. Quinn (eds.) Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 34–56.
• Blackburn, S. 1996. “Securing the Nots: Moral Epistemology for the Quasi-Realist.” In W. Sinnott-Armstrong & M. Timmons (eds.) Moral Knowledge?: New Readings in Moral Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Blackburn, S. 1998. Ruling Passions. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Blackburn, S. 1998. “Wittgenstein, Wright, Rorty and Minimalism.” Mind. 107. 157–82.
• Blackburn, S. 1998. “Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity” (Symposium on Gilbert Harman & Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 63. 195–98.
• Blackburn, S. 1999. “Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-Realist Foundation?” Inquiry. 42. 213-28.
• Blackburn, S. 2000. “Kant versus Hume on Practical Reasoning.” In D. P. Chattopadhyaya, et al. (eds.) Realism, Responses, and Reactions: Essays in Honour of Pranab Kumar Sen. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research. 462–80.
• Blackburn, S. 2000. “Relativism.” In H. LaFollette (ed.) The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. 38–52.
• Blackburn, S. 2001. “Reply.” Philosophical Books. 42. 27–32.
• Blackburn, S. 2001. “Normativity à la Mode.” Journal of Ethics. 5. 139–53.
• Blackburn, S. 2002. “Replies.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 65. 164–76.
• Blackburn, S. 2005. “Quasi-Realism No Fictionalism.” In M. Kalderon (ed.) Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 322–37.
• Blackburn, S. 2006. “Antirealist Expressivism and Quasi-Realism.” In D. Copp (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 146–62.
• Blackburn, S. 2006. “The Semantics of Non-Factualism, Non-Cognitivism, and Quasi-Realism.” In M. Devitt & R. Hanley (eds.) The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell. 244–51.
• Blackburn, S. 2006. “Must We Weep for Sentimentalism?” In J. Dreier (ed.) Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. 144–59.
• Blackburn, S. 2009. “Truth and A Priori Possibility: Egan’s Charge Against Quasi-Realism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 87. 201–13.
• Bovens, L. & D. Drai. 1999. “Supervenience and Moral Realism.” Philosophia. 27. 241–45.
• Brighouse, M. H. 1990. “Blackburn’s Projectivism: An Objection.” Philosophical Studies. 59. 225–33.
• Divers J. & A. Miller. 1994. “Why Expressivists about Value Should Not Love Minimalism about Truth.” Analysis. 54. 12–19.
• Dorr, C. 2002. “Non-Cognitivism and Wishful Thinking.” Noûs. 36. 97–103.
• Drai, D. 2000. “Moral Supervenience and Moral Thinking.” Disputatio. 8. 17–29.
• Dreier, J. 1993, “The Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 30. 13–38.
• Dreier, J. 1996. “Expressivist Embedding and Minimalist Truth.” Philosophical Studies. 83. 29–51.
• Dreier, J. 1996. “Accepting Agent-Centered Norms: A Problem for Non-Cognitivists and a Suggestion for Solving It.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 74. 409–22.
• Dreier, J. 1999. “Transforming Expressivism.” Noûs. 33. 558–72.
• Dreier, J. 2002. “The Expressivist Circle: Invoking Norms in the Explanation of Normative Judgment.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 65. 136–43.
• Dreier, J. 2002. “Troubling Developments in Metaethics: Mark Timmons, Morality without Foundations: A Defense of Moral Contextualism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).” Noûs. 361. 152–68.
• Dreier, J. 2004. “Metaethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism.” Philosophical Perspectives. 18. 23–44.
• Dreier, J. 2006. “Negation for Expressivists: A Collection of Problems with a Suggestion for Their Solution”. In R. Shafer-Landau. (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 217–34.
• Dreier, J. 2009. “Relativism (and Expressivism) and the Problem of Disagreement.” Philosophical Perspectives. 23. 79–110.
• Egan, A. 2007. “Quasi-Realism and Fundamental Moral Error.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 85. 205–19.
• Elliot, R. 1987. “Moral Realism and the Modal Argument.” Analysis. 47. 133–37.
• Elstein, D. 2007. “Against Sonderholm: Still Committed to Expressivism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 107. 111–16.
• Enoch, D. 2003. “How Noncognitivists Can Avoid Wishful Thinking.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 41. 527–45.
• Fenske, W. 1997. “Non-Cognitivism: A New Defense.” Journal of Value Inquiry. 31. 301–09.
• Fenske, W. 2000. “The Advantage of an Empirically Minded Conception of Non-Cognitivism.” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review. 39. 513–29.
• Fenske, W. 2001. “Empirically Minded Non-Cognitivism: As Serious as It Needs to Be.” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review. 40. 613–17.
• Gibbard, A. 1986. “An Expressivistic Theory of Normative Discourse.” Ethics. 96. 472–85.
• Gibbard, A. 1990. “Hare’s Analysis of ‘Ought’ and Its Implications.” In D. Seanor & N. Fotion (eds.) Hare and His Critics. 56–72.
• Gibbard, A. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Gibbard, A. 1992. “Morality and Thick Concepts I: Thick Concepts and Warrant for Feelings.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 66 (Supplement). 267–83.
• Gibbard, A. 2002. “Normative Concepts and Recognitional Concepts.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 64. 151–62.
• Gibbard, A. 2002. “Reply to Hawthorne.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 64. 179–83.
• Gibbard, A. 2003. Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Gibbard, A. 2006. “Reply to Critics.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 72. 729–44.
• Gibbard, A. 2006. “Normative Properties”. In T. Horgan and M. Timmons (eds.) Metaethics after Moore. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 319–38.
• Gibbard, A. 2008. Reconciling our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Hale, B. 1986. “The Compleat Projectivist.” Philosophical Quarterly. 36. 65–84.
• Hale, B. 1992. “Can There Be a Logic of Attitudes?" In J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.) Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 337–63.
• Hale, B. 2002. “Can Arboreal Knotwork Help Blackburn out of Frege’s Abyss?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 65. 144–49.
• Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 2000. “Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic.” Philosophical Papers. 29: 121–53.
• • [Reprint] Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 2000. “Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 58–70.
• Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 2006. “Cognitivist Expressivism.” In T. Horgan & M. Timmons (eds.) Metaethics after Moore. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 2006. “Expressivism, Yes! Relativism, No!” In R. Shafer-Landau (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 73–98.
• Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 2006. “Morality without Moral Facts.” In J. Dreier (ed.) Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. 220–38.
• Horwich, P. 1993. “Gibbard’s Theory of Norms” (Review of Wise Choices, Apt Feelings). Philosophy and Public Affairs. 22. 67–78.
• Horwich, P. 1994. “The Essence of Expressivism.” Analysis. 54. 19–20.
• Horwich, P. 2005. “The Frege-Geach Point.” Philosophical Issues. 15. 78–93.
• Jackson, F. 2001. “What is Expressivism?” Philosophical Books. 42. 10–17.
• Jackson, F., G. Oppy, & M. Smith. 1994. “Minimalism and Truth Aptness.” Mind. 103. 287–302.
• • [Reprint] Jackson, F., G. Oppy, & M. Smith. 1994. “Minimalism and Truth Aptness.” In F. Jackson, P. Pettit, & M. Smith (eds.) Mind, Morality, and Explanation: Selected Collaborations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2004. ??–??.
• Jackson, F. & P. Pettit. 1998. “A Problem for Expressivism.” Analysis. 58. 239–51.
• Jackson, F. & P. Pettit. 1999. “Reply to Ridge.” Brown Electronic Article Review Service, ed. J. Dreier & D. Estlund. http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/homepage.html.
• Jenkins, C. 2006. “Lewis and Blackburn on Quasi-Realism and Fictionalism.” Analysis. 66. 315–19.
• Joyce, R. 2002. “Expressivism and Motivational Internalism.” Analysis. 62. 336–44.
• Kölbel, M. 1997. “Expressivism and the Syntactic Uniformity of Declarative Sentences.” Critica. 24. 3–50.
• Kölbel, M. 2002. Truth without Objectivity. London: Routledge.
• Klagge, J. C. 1984. “An Alleged Difficulty Concerning Moral Properties.” Mind. 93. 370–80.
• Lenman, J. 1999. “The Externalist and the Amoralist.” Philosophia. 27. 441–57.
• Lenman, J. 2003. “Disciplined Syntacticism and Moral Expressivism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 66: 32–57.
• Lenman, J. 2003. “Non-Cognitivism and Wishfulness.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 6: 265–74.
• Lenman, J. 2003. “Non-Cognitivism and the Dimensions of Evaluative Judgement.” J. Dreier and D. Estlund (eds.) Brown Electronic Article Review Service. Available online at http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/homepage.html (posted January 2003).
• Lenman, J. 2007. “What is Moral Inquiry?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 81 (Supplement). 63–81.
• Lewis, D. 2005. “Quasi-realism is Fictionalism.” In M. Kalderon (ed.) Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 314–21.
• Mabrito, R. 2005. “Does Shafer-Landau Have a Problem with Supervenience?” Philosophical Studies. 126. 297–311.
• Majors, B. 2008. “Cognitivist Expressivism and the Nature of Belief.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 11. 279–93.
• Majors, B. 2009. “The Natural and the Normative.” In R. Shafer-Landau (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 4. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 29–52.
• Marino, P. 2005. “Expressivism, Deflationism, and Correspondence.” Journal of Moral Philosophy. 2. 171–91.
• Marino, P. 2006. “Expressivism, Logic, Consistency, and Moral Dilemmas.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 9. 517–33.
• McFetridge, I. G. 1985. “Supervenience, Realism, Necessity.” Philosophical Quarterly. 35. 245–58.
• McFetridge, I. G. 1986. “Review of Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Levy.” Analytic Philosophy. 27. 158–61.
• McGrath, M. 1998. “Quasi-Realism and the Humean Defense of Normative Non-Factualism.” Philosophical Studies. 90. 113–27.
• O’Leary-Hawthorne, J. & H. Price. 1996. “How to Stand up for Noncognitivists.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 74. 275–92.
• Pendlebury, M. 2002. “‘Ought’ Judgments and Motivation.” American Philosophical Quarterly. 39. 183–96.
• Pendlebury, M. 2007. “Objective Reasons.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 45. 533–63.
• Pendlebury, M. 2010. “How to be a Normative Expressivist.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 80. 182–207.
• Price, H. 1988. Facts and the Function of Truth. Oxford: Blackwell.
• Ridge, M. 1999. “Ridge Reviews Jackson and Pettit.” Brown Electronic Article Review Service, ed. J. Dreier & D. Estlund. http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/homepage.html.
• Ridge, M. 2003. “Non-Cognitivist Pragmatics and Stevenson’s ‘Do So As Well!’” Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 33. 563–74.
• Ridge, M. 2006. “Sincerity and Expressivism.” Philosophical Studies. 131. 487–510.
• Ridge, M. 2007. “Anti-Reductionism and Supervenience.” Journal of Moral Philosophy. 4. 330–48.
• Rosen, G. 1998. “Blackburn’s Essays in Quasi-Realism”. Noûs. 32. 386–405.
• Schroeder, M. 2008. “Expression For Expressivists.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 76. 86–116.
• Schroeder, M. 2008. “How Expressivists Can and Should Solve Their Problem With Negation.” Noûs. 42. 573–99.
• Schroeder, M. 2008. Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Schroeder, M. 2008. “What is the Frege-Geach Problem?” Philosophy Compass. 3. 703–20.
• Schroeder, M. 2009. Noncognitivism in Ethics. New York: Routledge.
• Schueler, G. F. 1988. “Modus Ponens and Moral Realism.” Ethics. 98. 492–500.
• • [Reprint] Schueler, G. F. 1988. “Modus Ponens and Moral Realism.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) 2006. Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. ??–??.
• Shoemaker, S. 1987. “Review of Simon Blackburn’s Spreading the Word.” Noûs. 21. 438–42.
• Sinclair, N. 2006. “The Moral Belief Problem.” Ratio. 19. 249–60.
• Sinclair, N. 2007. “Expressivism and the Practicality of Moral Convictions.” The Journal of Value Inquiry. 41. 201–20.
• Sinclair, N. 2007. “Propositional Clothing and Belief.” Philosophical Quarterly. 57. 342–62.
• Sinclair, N. 2008. “Free Thinking for Expressivists.” Philosophical Papers. 37. 261–86.
• Sinclair, N. 2009. “Recent Work in Expressivism.” Analysis. 69. 136–47.
• Sinnott-Armstrong, W. 1993. “Some Problems for Gibbard’s Norm-Expressivism.” Philosophical Studies. 69. 297–313.
• Sinnott-Armstrong, W. 2000. “Expressivism and Embedding.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 61. 677–93.
• Smith, M. 1994. “Why Expressivists about Value Should Love Minimalism about Truth.” Analysis. 54. 1–11.
• • [Reprint] Smith, M. 1994. “Why Expressivists about Value Should Love Minimalism about Truth.” In In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) 2006. Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. ??–??.
• Smith, M. 1994. “Minimalism, Truth-Aptness, and Belief.” Analysis. 54. 21–26.
• Smith, M. & D. Stoljar. 2003. “Is There a Lockean Argument Against Expressivism?” Analysis. 63. 76–86.
• • [Reprint] Smith, M. 1998. “Ethics and the A Priori: A Modern Parable.” In his Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2004. ??–??.
• Smith, T. 1987. “Moral Realism: Blackburn’s Response to the Frege Objection.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 25. 221–28.
• Sobel, J. H. 2001. “Blackburn’s Problem: On Its Not Insignificant Residue.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 62. 361–83.
• Sonderholm, J. 2005. “Why an Expressivist Should Not Commit to Commitment-Semantics.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 105. 403–09.
• Sonderholm, J. 2009. “Does Blackburn’s Expressivism Have a Problem with Respect to Supervenience? A Reply to Wright and Zangwill.” Metaphysica. 10. 89–95.
• Stoljar, D. 1993. “Emotivism and Truth Conditions.” Philosophical Studies. 70. 81–101.
• Timmons, M. 1993. “Irrealism and Error in Ethics.” Philosophia. 22. 373–406.
• Timmons, M. 1999. Morality without Foundations: A Defense of Moral Contextualism. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Unwin, N. 1999. “Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem.” Philosophical Quarterly. 49. 337–52.
• Unwin, N. 2001. “Norms and Negation: A Problem for Gibbard’s Logic.” Philosophical Quarterly. 51. 60–75.
• van Roojen, M. 1996. “Expressivism and Irrationality.” Philosophical Review. 105. 311–55.
• van Roojen, M. 2005. “Expressivism, Supervenience, and Logic.” Ratio. 18. 190–205.
• Wisdom, J. 2008. “Base Property Exemplification and Mixed Worlds: Remarks on the Shafer-Landau/Mabrito Exchange.” Philosophical Studies. 138. 429–34.
• Wright, C. 1985. “Review of Spreading the Word.” Mind. 94. 310–19.
• Zangwill, N. 1992. “Moral Modus Ponens.” Ratio. 5. 177–93.
• Zangwill, N. 1993. “Quasi-Realist Explanation.” Synthese. 97. 287–96.
• Zangwill, N. 1995. “Moral Supervenience.” Midwest Studies In Philosophy. 20. 240–62.

‘Is’ and ‘Ought’

Bibliography of philosophical work on ‘is’ and ‘ought’:

• Prior, A. N. 1949. Logic and the Basis of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Hare, R. M. 1952. The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958. “Modern Moral Philosophy.” Philosophy. 33. 1–10.
• Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958. “On Brute Facts.” Analysis. 18. 69–72.
• Foot, P. “Moral Arguments.” 1958. Mind. 67. 502–13.
• • Foot, P. “Moral Arguments.” 1958. In her Virtues and Vices. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1978. 96–109.
• Foot, P. “Moral Beliefs.” 1958. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 59. 83–104.
• • Foot, P. “Moral Beliefs.” 1958. In her Virtues and Vices. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1978. 110–31.
• MacIntyre, A. C. 1959. “Hume on ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’.” Philosophical Review. 68. 451–68.
• • MacIntyre, A. C. 1959. “Hume on ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’.” In W. D. Hudson (ed.) The Is/Ought Question. London: Macmillian and Co. 1969. 35–50.
• Prior, A. N. 1960. “The Autonomy of Ethics.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 38. 199–206.
• • Prior, A. N. 1960. “The Autonomy of Ethics.” In P. T. Geach and A. J. P. Kenny (eds.) Papers in Logic and Ethics. London: Duckworth. 1976. 88–96.
• Shorter, J. M. 1961. “Professor Prior on the Autonomy of Ethics.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 39. 286–87.
• Searle, J. R. 1964. “How to Derive ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’.” Philosophical Review. 73. 43–58.
• • Searle, J. R. 1964. “How to Derive ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’.” In W. D. Hudson (ed.) The Is/Ought Question. London: Macmillian and Co. 1969. 120–34.
• Thomson, J. & J. Thomson. 1964. “How Not to Derive ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’.” Philosophical Review. 73. 512–16.
• • Thomson, J. & J. Thomson. 1964. “How Not to Derive ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’.” In W. D. Hudson (ed.) The Is/Ought Question. London: Macmillian and Co. 1969. 163–67.
• Hare, R. M. 1964. “The Promising Game.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie. 70. 398–412.
• • Hare, R. M. 1964. “The Promising Game.” In W. D. Hudson (ed.) The Is/Ought Question. London: Macmillian and Co. 1969. 144–56.
• Black, M. 1964. “The Gap Between ‘Is’ and ‘Should’.” Philosophical Review. 73. 167–68.
• Cohen, M. F. 1965. “‘Is’ and ‘Should’: An Unbridged Gap.” Philosophical Review. 74. 220–28.
• Baker, G. P. & P. M. Hacker. 1966. “Rules, Definitions, and the Naturalistic Fallacy.” American Philosophical Quarterly. 3. 299–305.
• Hudson, W. D. (ed.) 1969. The Is/Ought Question. London: Macmillian and Co.
• Searle, J. R. 1969. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Kurtzman, D. R. 1970. “‘Is,’ ‘Ought,’ and the Autonomy of Ethics.” Philosophical Review. 79. 493–509.
• Wilkins, B. T. 1970. “The ‘Is’-‘Ought’ Controversy.” Ethics. 80. 162–63.
• Bruening, W. H. 1971. “Moore And ‘Is-Ought’.” Ethics. 81. 143–49.
• Gewirth, A. 1973. “The ‘Is-Ought’ Problem Resolved.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. 47. 34–61.
• Singer, P. 1973. “The Triviality of the Debate over ‘Is-Ought’ and the Definition of ‘Moral’.” American Philosophical Quarterly. 10. 51–56.
• Castañeda, H.-N. 1973. “On the Conceptual Autonomy of Morality.” Noûs. 7. 67–77.
• Jaggar, A. 1974. “It Does Not Matter Whether We Can Derive ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 3. 378–79.
• Jackson, F. 1974. “Defining the Autonomy of Ethics.” The Philosophical Review. 83. 88–96.
• Perry, T. D. 1974. “A Refutation of Searle’s Amended ‘Is-Ought’ Argument.” Analysis. 34. 133–39.
• Anderson, J. C. 1974. “A Note On Searle’s Naturalistic Fallacy Fallacy.” Analysis. 34 139–141.
• Witkowski, K. 1975. “The ‘Is-Ought’ Gap: Deduction or Justification?.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 36. 233–45.
• Geach, P. T. 1976. “Murder and Sodomy.” Philosophy. 51. 346–48.
• Geach, P. T. 1976. “Morally Significant Theses.” Open Mind. 4. 12.
• Borowski, E. J. 1977. “A Pyrrhic Defense of Moral Autonomy.” Philosophy. 52. 455–66.
• Hare, R. M. 1977. “Geach on Murder and Sodomy.” Philosophy. 52. 467–72.
• Geach, P. T. 1977. “Again the Logic of ‘Ought’.” Philosophy. 52. 473–76.
• Stove, D. C. 1978. “On Hume’s Is-Ought Thesis.” Hume Studies. 4. 64–72.
• Gewirth, A. 1979. “On Deriving a Morally Significant ‘Ought’.” Philosophy. 54. 231–32.
• Nielsen, K. 1979. “On Deriving an Ought from an Is: A Retrospective Look.” Review of Metaphysics. 32. 487–514.
• Paul, J. 1979. “Gewirth’s Solution to the ‘Is-Ought’ Problem.” Personalist. 60. 442–47.
• Borowski, E. J. 1980. “Moral Autonomy Fights Back.” Philosophy. 55. 95–100.
• Allen, P. 1982. “‘Ought’ from ‘Is’: What Hare and Gewirth Should Have Said." American Journal of Theological Philosophy. 3. 90–97.
• Allen, P. 1982. “A Critique of Gewirth’s ‘Is-Ought’ Derivation.” Ethics. 92. 211–26.
• Hudson, W. D. 1984. “The ‘Is-Ought’ Problem Resolved?” In E. Regis Jr. (ed.) Gewirth’s Ethical Rationalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 59–83.
• Karmo, T. 1988. “Some Valid (But No Sound) Arguments Trivially Span the ‘Is’-‘Ought’ Gap.” Mind. 97. 252–57.
• Pigden, C. R. 1989. “Logic and the Autonomy of Ethics.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 67. 127–51.
• Schurz, G. 1991, “How Far Can Hume’s Is-Ought-Thesis Be Generalized? An Investigation in Alethic-Deontic Modal Predicate Logic.” Journal of Philosophical Logic. 20. 37–95.
• Schurz, G. 1994. “Hume’s Is-Ought Thesis in Logics with Alethic-Deontic Bridge Principles.” Logique et Analyse. 37. 265–93.
• Nelson, M. T. 1995. “Is it Always Fallacious to Derive Values from Facts?” Argumentation. 9. 553–62.
• Schurz, G. 1997. The Is-Ought Problem: An Investigation in Philosophical Logic. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
• Maitzen, S. 1998. “Closing the ‘Is’-‘Ought’ Gap.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 28. 349–66.
• Nelson, M. T. 2003. “Who Needs Valid Moral Arguments?” Argumentation. 17. 35–42.
• Kupperman, J. J. 2005. “A New Look at the Logic of the ‘Is’-‘Ought’ Relation.” Philosophy. 80. 343–59.
• Sinnott-Armstrong, W. 2006. Moral Skepticisms. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Nelson, M. T. 2007. “More Bad News for the Logical Autonomy of Ethics.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 37. 203–16.
• Guevara, D. 2008. “Rebutting Formally Valid Counterexamples to the Humean ‘Is-Ought’ Dictum.” Synthese. 164. 45–60.
• Hill, S. 2008. “‘Is’-‘Ought’ Derivations and Ethical Taxonomies.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel. 36. 545–66.
• Maitzen, S. 2008. “Anti-Autonomism Defended: A Reply to Hill.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 36. 569.
• Wall, E. 2008. “Searle’s Derivation, Natural Law, and Moral Relativism.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel. 36. 237–49.
• Hill, S. 2009. “Good News for the Logical Autonomy of Ethics.” Argumentation. 23. 277–83.
• Pigden, C. R. 2010 (ed.) Hume on Is and Ought. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Restall, G. & G. Russell. 2010. “Barriers to Implication.” In C. R. Pigden (ed.) Hume on Is and Ought. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 243–59.
• Maitzen, S. 2010. “Moral Conclusions from Nonmoral Premises.” In C. R. Pigden (ed.) Hume on Is and Ought. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 290–309.
• Maitzen, S. 2010. “Reply to Pigden and Schurz.” In C. R. Pigden (ed.) Hume on Is and Ought. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 320–24.
• Wall, E. 2011. “Problems with Searle’s Derivation?” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel. 39. 571–80.

The Open Question Argument

Bibliography of philosophical work on the open question argument:

• Moore, G. E. 1903. Principia Ethica, revised edition, edited by T. Baldwin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1993.
• • [Excerpt] Moore, G. E. 1903. “The Open Question Argument: The Subject-Matter of Ethics.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 2006. 31–46.
  • [Excerpt] Moore, G. E. 1903. “The Subject-Matter of Ethics.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 465–73.
• Moore, G. E. 1922. “Preface to the Second Edition.” In his Principia Ethica, revised edition, edited by T. Baldwin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1993. 1–27.
• Moore, G. E. 1942. “A Reply to my Critics.” In P. A. Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 535–677.
• Hare, R. M. 1952. The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Cooper, B. C. 1959. “The Alleged Indefinability of Good.” Journal of Philosophy. 56. 977–985.
• Lange, J. F. 1966. “R. M. Hare’s Reformulation of the Open Question.” Mind. 75. 244–47.
• Ball, S. W. 1988. “Reductionism in Ethics and Science: A Contemporary Look at G. E. Moore’s Open-Question Argument.” American Philosophical Quarterly. 25. 197–213.
• Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 1992. “Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The ‘Open Question Argument’ Revived.” Philosophical Papers. 21. 153–75.
• • [Reprint] Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 1992. “Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The ‘Open Question Argument’ Revived.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. 2006. London: Routledge.
• Darwall, S., A. Gibbard, & P. Railton. 1992. “Toward Fin de siècle Ethics: Some Trends.” Philosophical Review. 101. 115–89.
• Rosati, C. 1995. “Naturalism, Normativity, and the Open Question Argument.” Noûs. 29. 46–70.
• Rosati, C. 2003. “Agency and the Open Question Argument.” Ethics. 113. 490–527.
• Strandberg, C. 2004. “In Defence of the Open Question Argument.” Journal of Ethics. 8. 179–96.
• Feldman, F. 2005. “The Open Question Argument: What It Isn’t; And What It Is.” Philosophical Issues. 15. 22–43.

The Naturalistic Fallacy

Bibliography of philosophical work on the naturalistic fallacy:

• Moore, G. E. 1903. Principia Ethica, revised edition, edited by T. Baldwin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1993.
  • [Excerpt] Moore, G. E. 1903. “The Open Question Argument: The Subject-Matter of Ethics.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 2006. 31–46.
  • [Excerpt] Moore, G. E. 1903. “The Subject-Matter of Ethics.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 465–73.
• Moore, G. E. 1922. “Preface to the Second Edition.” In his Principia Ethica, revised edition, edited by T. Baldwin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1993. 1–27.
• Frankena, W. K. 1939. “The Naturalistic Fallacy.” Mind. 48. 464–77.
  • [Reprint] Frankena, W. K. 1939. “The Naturalistic Fallacy.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 2006. ??–??.
• Moore, G. E. 1942. “A Reply to my Critics.” In P. A. Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 535–677.
• Prior, A. N. 1949. Logic and the Basis of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Geach, P. T. 1956. “Good and Evil.” Analysis. 17. 33–42.
• Cooper, B. C. 1959. “The Alleged Indefinability of Good.” Journal of Philosophy. 56. 977–985.
• Nakhnikian, G. 1963. “On the Naturalistic Fallacy.” In H.-N. Castañeda and G. Nakhnikian (eds.) Morality and the Language of Conduct. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. 145–58.
• Lewy, C. 1965. “G. E. Moore on the Naturalistic Fallacy.” Proceedings of the British Academy. 50. 251–62.
• • Lewy, C. 1965. “G. E. Moore on the Naturalistic Fallacy.” In P. F. Strawson (ed.) Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action. London: Oxford University Press. 1968.
• Baker, G. P. & P. M. Hacker. 1966. “Rules, Definitions, and the Naturalistic Fallacy.” American Philosophical Quarterly. 3. 299–305.
• Gauthier, D. P. 1967. “Moore’s Naturalistic Fallacy.” American Philosophical Quarterly. 4. 315–20.
• Baumrin, B. H. 1968. “Is There a Naturalistic Fallacy?” American Philosophical Quarterly. 5. 79–89.
• Luebke, N. R. 1970. “Frankena On The Naturalistic Fallacy.” Journal of Thought. 5. 262–72.
• Duncan, E. 1970. “Has Anyone Committed the Naturalistic Fallacy?” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 8. 49–55.
• Bruening, W. H. 1971. “Moore And ‘Is-Ought’.” Ethics. 81. 143–49.
• Kolnai, A. 1980. “The Ghost of the Naturalistic Fallacy.” Philosophy. 55. 5–16.

Motivation and Amoralists

Bibliography of philosophical work on motivation and amoralists:

• Hare, R. M. 1952. The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin Books.
• • [Excerpt] Mackie, J. L. 1977. “The Subjectivity of Values.” In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.) Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1988. 95–118.
  • [Excerpt] Mackie, J. L. 1977. “The Arguments from Relativity and Queerness.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 2006. 75–9.
  • [Excerpt] Mackie, J. L. 1977. “The Subjectivity of Values.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 13–22.
• Darwall, S. L. 1983. Impartial Reason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
• Brink, D. O. 1984. “Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments from Disagreement and Queerness.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 62. 111–25.
• [Reprint] Brink, D. O. 1984. “Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments from Disagreement and Queerness.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 2006. 80–95.
• Brink, D. O. 1986. “Externalist Moral Realism.” Southern Journal of Philosophy (Spindel Conference Supplement on Moral Realism). 24. 23–40.
• Boyd, R. 1988. “How to be a Moral Realist.” In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.) Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 187–228.
• • [Reprint+] Reprinted with “Postscript: Materialism and Realism in Metaethics” in P. K. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.) 1995. Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. London: Routledge. 307–70.
  • [Reprint] Boyd, R. 1988. “How to be a Moral Realist.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 163–85.
• Brink, D. O. 1989. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Smith, M. 1994. The Moral Problem. Oxford: Blackwell.
• • [Excerpt] Smith, M. 1994. “The Externalist Challenge.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) 2006. Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 529–46??
  • [Excerpt] Smith, M. 1994. “The Externalist Challenge.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 231–42.
• Copp, D. 1995. “Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 21 (Supplement). ??–??.
• • [Reprint] Copp, D. 1995. “Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation.” In J. Couture & K. Nielsen (eds.) On the Relevance of Metaethics. Calgary: University of Calgary. 1996. ??–??.
• Blackburn, S. 1995. “The Flight to Reality.” In R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, & W. Quinn (eds.) Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 34–56.
• Mele, A. 1996. “Internalist Moral Cognitivism and Listlessness.” Ethics. 106. 727–53.
• Miller, A. 1996. “An Objection to Smith’s Argument for Internalism.” Analysis. 56. 169–74.
• Smith, M. 1996. “The Argument for Internalism: Reply to Miller.” Analysis. 56. 175–184
• Brink, D. O. 1997. “Moral Motivation” (Symposium on Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem). Ethics. 108. 4–32.
• Copp, D. 1997. “Belief, Reason, and Motivation: Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem” (Symposium on Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem). Ethics. 108. 49–50.
• Smith, M. 1997. “In Defence of The Moral Problem: A Reply to Brink, Copp and Sayre-McCord” (Symposium on his The Moral Problem). Ethics. 108. 84–119.
• • [Reprint] Smith, M. 1997. “In Defence of The Moral Problem: A Reply to Brink, Copp and Sayre-McCord.” In his Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2004. ??–??.
• Lillehammer, H. 1997. “Smith on Moral Fetishism.” Analysis. 57. 187–95.
• Parfit, D. 1997. “Reasons and Motivation.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (Supplement). 99–130.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 1998. “Moral Judgement and Moral Motivation.” Philosophical Quarterly. 48. 353–58.
• Svavarsdóttir, S. 1999. “Moral Cognitivism and Motivation.”Philosophical Review. 108. 161–219.
• Svavarsdóttir, S. 1999. “On Simon Blackburn’s Ruling Passions.” Philosophical Books. 42. ??–??
• Blackburn, S. 1999. “Reply.” Philosophical Books 42. ??–??
• Lenman, J. 1999. “The Amoralist and the Externalist.” Philosophia. 27. 441–57.
• Cuneo, T. 1999. “An Externalist Solution to the ‘Moral Problem’.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 59. 359–80.
• Dreier, J. 2000. “Dispositions and Fetishes: Externalist Models of Moral Motivation.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 61. 619–38.
• Sobel, J. H. 2001. “On Michael Smith’s Internalisms.” Erkenntnis. 54. 345–73.
• Olson, J. 2002. “Are Desires De Dicto Fetishistic?” Inquiry. 45. 89–96.
• Zangwill, N. 2003. “Externalist Moral Motivation.” American Philosophical Quarterly. 40. 143–54.
• Sadler, B. 2003. “The Possibility of Amoralism: A Defence Against Internalism.” Philosophy. 78. 63–78.
• Lenman, J. 2003. “Moral Deviants and Amoral Saints: A Dilemma for Moral Externalism.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 41. 223–40.
• Mele, A. 2003. Motivation and Agency. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 2003. Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Toppinen, T. 2004. “Moral Fetishism Revisited.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 94. 305–13.
• Svavarsdóttir, S. 2005. “How Do Moral Judgments Motivate?.” In J. Dreier (ed.) Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. 163–81.
• Wallace, R. J. 2005. “Moral Motivation.” In J. Dreier (ed.) Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. 182–96.
• Gert, J. & A. Mele. 2005. “Lenman on Externalism and Amoralism: An Interplanetary Exploration.” Philosophia. 32. 275-83.
• Tresan, J. 2006. “De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism.” Noûs. 40. 143–65.
• Strandberg, C. 2007. “Externalism and the Content of Moral Motivation.” Philosophia. 35. 249–60.
• Zangwill, N. 2008. “The Indifference Argument.” Philosophical Studies. 138. 91–124.
• Matthew, D. C. 2008. “Michael Smith and Moral Motivation: How Good Are Ostensibly Good People?” Journal of Value Inquiry. 42. 519–31.
• Bedke, M. S. 2009. “Moral Judgment Purposivism: Saving Internalism from Amoralism.” Philosophical Studies. 144. 189–209.
• Tresan, J. 2009. “Metaethical Internalism: Another Neglected Distinction.” Journal of Ethics. 13. 51–72.
• Francén, R. 2010. “Moral Motivation Pluralism.” Journal of Ethics. 14. 117–48.
• Cholbi, M. 2011. “Depression, Listlessness, and Moral Motivation.” Ratio. 24. 28–45.

Internal and External Reasons

Bibliography of philosophical work on internal and external reasons:

• Prichard, H. A. 1928. “Duty and Interest.” In his Moral Obligation and Duty and Interest: Essays and Lectures, ed. J. O. Urmson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1968. 203–38.
• • Prichard, H. A. 1928. “Duty and Interest.” In his Moral Writings, ed. J. MacAdam. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2002. 21–49.
• Falk, W. D. 1947. “‘Ought’ and Motivation.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 48. 492–510.
• • [Reprint] Falk, W. D. 1947. “‘Ought’ and Motivation.” In W. Sellars & J. Hospers (eds.) Readings in Ethical Theory. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 1952. 492–510.
  • [Reprint] Falk, W. D. 1947. “‘Ought’ and Motivation.” In his Ought, Reasons, and Morality: The Collected Papers of W. D. Falk, ed. by K. Baier. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1986. 21–41.
• Frankena, W. 1958. “Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy.” In A. Melden (ed.) Essays in Moral Philosophy. Seattle: University of Washington Press. 40–81.
• Nagel, T. 1970. The Possibility of Altruism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Williams, B. 1979. “Internal and External Reasons.” In R. Harrison (ed.) Rational Action: Studies in Philosophy and Social Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 17–28.
• • Williams, B. 1979. “Internal and External Reasons.” In his Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1981. 101–13.
  • Williams, B. 1979. “Internal and External Reasons.” In E. Millgram (ed.) Varieties of Practical Reasoning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2001. ??–??
  • Williams, B. 1979. “Internal and External Reasons.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. ??–??.
• Darwall, S. 1983. Impartial Reason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
• Williams, B. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Cohon, R. 1986. “Are External Reasons Impossible?” Ethics. 96. 545–56.
• Korsgaard, C. 1986. “Skepticism about Practical Reason.” Journal of Philosophy. 83. 5–25.
• • [Reprint] Korsgaard, C. 1986. “Skepticism about Practical Reason.” In S. Darwall, A. Gibbard, & P. Railton (eds.) Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1995. 373–87.
  • [Reprint] Korsgaard, C. 1986. “Skepticism about Practical Reason.” In her Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996. ??–??.
  • [Reprint] Korsgaard, C. 1986. “Skepticism about Practical Reason.” In E. Millgram (ed.) Varieties of Practical Reasoning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2001. ??–??
  • [Reprint] Korsgaard, C. 1986. “Skepticism about Practical Reason.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. ??–??.
• Robertson, J. 1986. “Internalism about Moral Reasons.” Pacifc Philosophical Quarterly. 67. 124–35.
• Hooker, B. 1987. “Williams’ Argument Against External Reasons.” Analysis. 47. 42–44.
• • Hooker, B. 1987. “Williams’ Argument Against External Reasons.” In E. Millgram (ed.) Varieties of Practical Reasoning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2001. ??–??
• Williams, B. 1989. “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame.” Logos: Philosophic Issues in Christian Perspective. 10. 1–12.
• • Williams, B. 1989. “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame.” Reprinted in his Making Sense of Humanity, and Other Philosophical Papers, 1982–1993. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1995. 35–45.
• Wallace, R. J. 1990. “How to Argue About Practical Reason.” Mind. 99. 355–85.
• Hajdin, M. 1992. “External Reasons and the Foundations of Morality: Mother Theresa versus Thrasymachus.” Journal of Value Inquiry. 26. 433–41.
• Cohon, R. 1993. “Internalism about Reasons for Action.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 74. 265–88.
• McDowell, J. 1995. “Might There Be External Reasons?” In J. E. J. Altham & R. Harrison (eds.) World, Mind and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 68–85.
• Williams, B. 1995. “Replies.” In J. E. J. Altham & R. Harrison (eds.) World, Mind and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 185–224.
• Smith, M. 1995. “Internal Reasons.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 60. 109–131.
• Millgram, E. 1996. “Williams’ Argument Against External Reasons.” Noûs. 30. 197–220.
• Parfit, D. 1997. “Reasons and Motivation.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (Supplement). 99–130.
• Hampton, J. 1998. The Authority of Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Johnson, R. 1999. “Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy.” Philosophical Quarterly. 49. 53–71.
• Price, T. 1999. “Are Williams’s Reasons Problematically External After All?” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 37. 461–78.
• Lillehammer, H. 2000. “The Doctrine of Internal Reasons.” Journal of Value Inquiry. 34. 507–16.
• Williams, B. 2001. “Postscript: Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons.” In E. Millgram (ed.) Varieties of Practical Reasoning. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 91–97.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 2003. Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Brunero, J. 2004. “Korsgaard on Motivational Skepticism.” Journal of Value Inquiry. 38. 253–64.
• Heuer, U. 2004. “Reasons for Action and Desires.” Philosophical Studies. 121. 43–63.
• Setiya, K. 2004. “Against Internalism.” Noûs. 38. 266–98.
• Cowley, C. 2005. “A New Defence of Williams’s Reasons-Internalism.” Philosophical Investigations. 28. 346–68.
• Russell, P. 2006. “Practical Reason and Motivational Scepticism.” In H. F. Klemme, M. Kühn, D. Schönecker (eds.) Moralische Motivation: Kant und die Alternativen. Hamburg: Meiner Verlag. 287–98.
• Wong, D. 2006. “Moral Reasons: Internal and External.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 72. 536–58.
• Brunero, J. 2007. “McDowell on External Reasons.” European Journal of Philosophy. 16. 22–42.
• Skorupski, J. 2007. “Internal Reasons and the Scope of Blame.” In A. Thomas (ed.) Bernard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 73–103.
• Anomaly, J. 2007. “An Argument Against External Reasons.” Sorites. 18. 56–9.
• Finlay, S. 2009. “The Obscurity of Internal Reasons.” Philosophers’ Imprint. 9. 1–22.
• Bedke, M. S. 2010. “Rationalist Restrictions and External Reasons.” Philosophical Studies. 151. 39–57.

Moral Explanations

Bibliography of philosophical work on moral explanations:

• Harman, G. 1977. The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
• • [Reprint] Harman, G. 1977. “Ethics and Observation.” In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.) Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1988. 119–26.
  • [Reprint] Harman, G. 1977. “Ethics and Observation.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 333–36.
• Flanagan Jr., O. J. 1982. “Quinean Ethics.” Ethics. 93. 56–74.
• Werner, R. 1983. “Ethical Realism.” Ethics. 93. 653–79.
• Postow, B. C. 1985. “Werner’s Ethical Realism.” Ethics. 95. 285–91.
• Werner, R. 1985. “Ethical Realism Defended.” Ethics. 95. 292–96.
• Sturgeon, N. 1985. “Moral Explanations.” In D. Copp & D. Zimmerman (eds.) Morality, Reason, and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld. 49–78.
• • [Reprint] Sturgeon, N. 1985. “Moral Explanations.” In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.) Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1988. 229–55.
  • [Reprint] Sturgeon, N. 1985. “Moral Explanations.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 2006. ??–??.
  • [Reprint] Sturgeon, N. 1985. “Moral Explanations.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 337–52.
• Zimmerman, D. 1985. “Moral Realism and Explanatory Necessity.” In D. Copp & D. Zimmerman (eds.) Morality, Reason, and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld. 80–103.
• Railton, P. 1986. “Moral Realism.” Philosophical Review. 95. 163–207.
• • [Reprint] Railton, P. 1986. “Moral Realism.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 2006.
  • [Reprint] Railton, P. 1986. “Moral Realism.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 186–205.
• Quinn, W. 1986. “Truth and Explanation in Ethics.” Ethics. 96. 524–44.
• Harman, G. 1986. “Moral Explanations of Natural Facts: Can Moral Claims Be Tested Against Moral Reality?” Southern Journal of Philosophy. (Spindel Conference Supplement on Moral Realism). 24. 57–68.
• Sturgeon, N. 1986. “Harman on Moral Explanations of Natural Facts.” Southern Journal of Philosophy (Spindel Conference Supplement on Moral Realism). 24. 69–78.
• Lycan, W. G. 1986. “Moral Facts and Moral Knowledge.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. (Spindel Conference Supplement on Moral Realism). 24. 79–94.
• Wong, D. 1986. “On Moral Realism Without Foundations.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. (Spindel Conference Supplement on Moral Realism). 24. 95–113.
• Sayre-McCord, G. 1988. “Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence.” In his (ed.) Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 256–81.
• Gibson, R. F. 1988. “Flanagan on Quinean Ethics.” Ethics. 98. 534–40.
• Flanagan Jr., O. J. 1988. “Pragmatism, Ethics, and Correspondence Truth: Response to Gibson and Quine.” Ethics. 98. 541–49.
• Brink, D. O. 1989. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Copp, D. 1990. “Explanation and Justification in Ethics.” Ethics. 100. 237–58.
• Jobe, E. K. 1990. “Sturgeon’s Defence of Moral Realism.” Dialogue. 29. 267–76.
• Sturgeon, N. 1991. “Contents and Causes: A Reply to Blackburn.” Philosophical Studies. 61. 19–37.
• Sullivan, S. J. 1991. “Harman, Ethical Naturalism, and Token-Token Identity.” Philosophical Papers. 20. 203–05.
• Moore, M. S. 1992. “Moral Reality Revisited.” Michigan Law Review. 2424–2533.
• Sturgeon, N. 1992. “Nonmoral Explanations.” Philosophical Perspectives. 6. 97–117.
• Wright, C. 1992. Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Sencerz, S. 1993. “Empiricism in Science and Ethics.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 31. 449–70.
• Little, M. O. 1994. “Recent Work in Moral Realism I: Naturalism.” Philosophical Books. 35. 145–53.
• Yasenchuk, K. 1994. “Sturgeon and Brink on Moral Explanations.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 32. 483–502.
• Sencerz, S. 1995. “Moral Conversions, Moral Feelings, and Evidence for Moral Facts.” Journal of Social Philosophy. 26. 157–69.
• Wright, C. 1995. “Truth in Ethics.” Ratio. 8. 209–26.
  • [Reprint] Wright, C. 1995. “Truth in Ethics.” In B. Hooker (ed.) Truth in Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. 1996. 1–18.
• Sturgeon, N. 1998. “Thomson Against Moral Explanations.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 58. 199–206.
• Johnson, R. N. 1998. “Minding One’s Manners: Revisiting Moral Explanations.” Philosophical Studies. 90. 181–203.
• Harman, G. 1998. “Responses to Critics.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 58. 207–13.
• Slowik, E. 1999. “Moral and Scientific Explanation: Re-Examining the Harman/Sturgeon Debate.” Cogito. 13. 39–44.
• Huemer, M. 2000. “Naturalism and the Problem of Moral Knowledge.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 38. 575–97.
• Leiter, B. 2001. “Moral Facts and Best Explanations.” Social Philosophy and Policy. 18. 79–101.
• Devitt, M. 2002. “Moral Realism: A Naturalistic Perspective.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy. 2. 1–15.
• Miller, A. 2003. An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Cambridge: Polity Press.
• Majors, B. 2003. “Moral Explanation and the Special Sciences.” Philosophical Studies. 113. 121–52.
• Loeb, D. 2003. “Gastronomic Realism: A Cautionary Tale.” Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. 23. 30–49.
• Loeb, D. 2005. “Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 70. 193–208.
• Berčić, B. 2006. “Devitt on Moral Realism.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy. 6. 63–68.
• Devitt, M. 2006. “Responses to the Rijeka Papers.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy. 6. 97–112.
• Sturgeon, N. 2006. “Moral Explanations Defended.” In J. Dreier (ed.) Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. 241–62.
• Nelson, M. T. 2006. “Moral Realism and Program Explanation.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 84. 417–28.
• Majors, B. 2007. “Moral Explanation.” Philosophy Compass. 2. 1–15.
• Millum, J. 2008. “A Biological Alternative to Moral Explanations.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 46. 385–407.
• Miller, A. 2009. “Moral Realism and Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 1: Reply to Nelson.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 87. 337–41.
• Bloomfield, P. 2009. “Moral Realism And Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 2: Reply To Miller.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 87. 343–44.
• Zangwill, N. 2010. “Science and Ethics: Demarcation, Holism and Logical Consequences.” European Journal of Philosophy. 18. 126–38.

Thick Concepts

Bibliography of philosophical work on thick concepts:

• McDowell, J. 1978. “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 52 (Supplement). 13–29.
• McDowell, J. 1979. “Virtue and Reason.” Monist. 62. 331–50.
• McDowell, J. 1981. “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following.” In S. Holtzman and C. M. Leich (eds.) Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 141–62.
• • [Reprint] McDowell, J. 1981. “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 2006. 453–69.
• Williams, B. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Scheffler, S. 1987. “Morality Through Thick and Thin: A Critical Notice of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.” Philosophical Review. 96. 411–34.
• Gibbard, A. 1992. “Morality and Thick Concepts I: Thick Concepts and Warrant for Feelings.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 66 (Supplement). 267–83.
• Blackburn, S. 1992. “Morality and Thick Concepts II: Through Thick and Thin.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 66 (Supplement). 285–99.
• Burton, S. L. 1992. “‘Thick’ Concepts Revised.” Analysis. 52. 28–32.
• • [Reprint] Burton, S. L. 1992. “‘Thick’ Concepts Revised.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 2006. ??–??.
• Garrard, E. & D. McNaughton. 1993. “Thick Concepts Revisited: A Reply to Burton.” Analysis. 53. 57–58.
• • [Reprint] Garrard, E. & D. McNaughton. 1993. “Thick Concepts Revisited: A Reply to Burton.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 2006. ??–??.
• Burton, S. L. 1993. “Reply to Garrard and McNaughton.” Analysis. 53. 59–61.
• • [Reprint] Burton, S. L. 1993. “Reply to Garrard and McNaughton.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 2006. ??–??.
• Dancy, J. 1993. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell.
• Williams, B. 1995. “Truth in Ethics.” Ratio. 8. 227–36.
• Dancy, J. 1995. “In Defense of Thick Concepts.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy. 20. 263–279.
• Millikan, R. G. 1995. “Pushmi-Pullyu Representations.” Philosophical Perspectives. 9. 185–200.
• Blackburn, S. 1998. Ruling Passions. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Scanlon, T. M. 2003. “Thickness and Theory.” Journal of Philosophy. 100. 275–287.
• Gibbard, A. 2003. “Reasons Thin and Thick.” Journal of Philosophy. 100. 288–304.
• Tappolet, C. 2004. “Through Thick and Thin: Good and Its Determinates.” Dialectica. 58. 207–21.
• Miščević, N. 2006. “Moral Concepts: From Thickness to Response-Dependence.” Acta Analytica. 21. 4–32.
• Blomberg, O. 2007. “Disentangling the Thick Concept Argument.” Sats: Nordic Journal of Philosophy. 8. 63–78.
• Väyrynen, P. 2009. “Objectionable Thick Concepts in Denials.” Philosophical Perspectives. 23. 439–69.
• Elstein, D. & T. Hurka. 2009. “From Thick to Thin: Two Moral Reduction Plans.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 39. 515–35.
• Croom, A. M. 2010. “Thick Concepts, Non-Cognitivism, and Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Considerations.” South African Journal of Philosophy. 29. ??–??
• Väyrynen, P. 2011. “Thick Concepts and Variability.” Philosophers’ Imprint. 11. 1–17??.

Moral Twin Earth

Bibliography of philosophical work on Moral Twin Earth:

• Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 1990–91. “New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth.” Journal of Philosophical Research. 16. 447–65.
  • [Reprint] Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 1990–91. “New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth.” In J. Heil (ed.) Rationality, Morality, and Self-Interest: Essays Honoring Mark Carl Overvold. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 115–33.
  • [Reprint] Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 1990–91. “New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 495–??.
• Kraemer, E. R. 1990–91. “On the Moral Twin Earth Challenge to New Wave Moral Realism.” Journal of Philosophical Research. 16. 467–72.
• Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 1992. “Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The ‘Open Question Argument’ Revived.” Philosophical Papers. 21. 153–75.
  • [Reprint] Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 1992. “Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The ‘Open Question Argument’ Revived.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) Arguing about Metaethics. 2006. London: Routledge.
• Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 1992. “Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revisited.” Synthese. 92. 221–60.
• Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 1996. “From Moral Realism to Moral Relativism in One Easy Step.” Crítica. 28. 3–39.
• Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 1996. “Troubles for Michael Smith’s Metaethical Rationalism.” Philosophical Papers. 25. 203–31.
• Sayre-McCord, G. 1997. “Good on Twin Earth.” Philosophical Issues. 8. 267–92.
• Kim, J. 1997. “Moral Kinds and Natural Kinds: What’s the Difference—For a Naturalist?” Philosophical Issues. 8. 293–301.
• Sosa, E. 1997. “Water, Drink, and ‘Moral Kinds.’” Philosophical Issues. 8. 303–12.
• Sayre-McCord, G. 1997. “Replies to Comments.” Philosophical Issues. 8. 313–23.
• Laurence, S., E. Margolis, & A. Dawson. 1999. “Moral Realism and Moral Twin Earth.” Facta Philosophica. 1. 135–65.
• Copp, D. 2000. “Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth.” Synthese. 124. 113–37.
• Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 2000. “Copping Out on Moral Twin Earth.” Synthese. 124. 139–52.
• Brink, D. O. 2001. “Realism, Naturalism, and Moral Semantics.” Social Philosophy and Policy. 18. 154–76.
• Holland, S. 2001. “Dispositional Theories of Value Meet Moral Twin Earth.” American Philosophical Quarterly. 38. 177–95.
• Merli, D. 2002. “Return to Moral Twin Earth.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 32. 207–40.
• Geirsson, H. 2003. “Moral Twin Earth: The Intuitive Argument.” Southwest Philosophy Review. 19. 115–24.
• Geirsson, H. 2005. “Moral Twin-Earth and Semantic Moral Realism.” Erkenntnis. 62. 353–78.
• van Roojen, M. 2006. “Knowing Enough to Disagree: A New Response to the Moral Twin Earth Argument.” In R. Shafer-Landau. (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 161–93.
• Gert, J. 2006. “Problems for Moral Twin Earth Arguments.” Synthese. 150. 171–83.
• Copp, D. 2007. “Referring to Moral Properties: Moral Twin Earth, Again.” In his Morality in a Natural World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 230–45.
• Merli, D. 2007. “Moral Convergence and the Univocity Problem.” American Philosophical Quarterly. 44. 297–313.
• Rubin, M. 2008. “Sound Intuitions on Moral Twin Earth.” Philosophical Studies. 139. 307–27.
• Viggiano, A. 2008. “Ethical Naturalism and Moral Twin Earth.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 11. 213–24.
• Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 2009. “Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth.” In I. Ravenscroft (ed.) Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 221–36.

The Euthyphro Dilemma

Bibliography of philosophical work on the Euthyphro dilemma:

• Adams, R. M. 1973. “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness.” In G. Outka & J. P. Reeder, Jr. (eds.) Religion and Morality. Garden City: Anchor. 318–47.
• • [Reprint] Adams, R. M. 1973. “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness.” In P. Helm (ed.) Divine Commands and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1981. 83–108.
  • [Reprint] Adams, R. M. 1973. “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness.” In his The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1987. 97–122.
• Quinn, P. 1978. Divine Commands and Moral Requirements. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Quinn, P. 1979. “Divine Command Ethics: A Causal Theory.” In J. Idziak (ed.) Divine Command Morality: Historical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Edwin Mellen. 305–25.
• • [Reprint] Quinn, P. 1979. “Divine Command Ethics: A Causal Theory.” In his Essays in the Philosophy of Religion. 2006. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 37–52.
• Adams, R. M. 1979. “Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again.” Journal of Religious Ethics. 7. 66–79.
• • [Reprint] Adams, R. M. 1979. “Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again.” In his The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1987. 128–43.
• Macbeath, M. 1982. “The Euthyphro Dilemma.” Mind. 91. 565–71.
• Nielsen, K. 1982. “God and the Basis of Morality.” Journal of Religious Ethics. 10. 335–50.
• Talbott, T. B. 1982. “Quinn on Divine Commands and Moral Requirements.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 13. 193–208.
• Clark, S. R. L. 1982. “God’s Law and Morality.” Philosophical Quarterly. 32. 339–47.
• Kretzmann, N. 1983. “Abraham, Isaac, and Euthyphro: God and the Basis of Morality.” In D. V. Stump, et al. (eds.) Hamartia: The Concept of Error in the Western Tradition. New York: Edwin Mellen. 27–50.
• Wierenga, E. 1983. “A Defensible Divine Command Theory.” Noûs. 17. 387–407.
• Chandler, J. 1985. “Clark on God’s Law and Morality.” The Philosophical Quarterly. 35. 87–90.
• Chandler, J. 1985. “Divine Command Theories and the Appeal to Love.” American Philosophical Quarterly. 22. 231–39.
• Clark, S. R. L. 1987. “God’s Law and Chandler.” Philosophical Quarterly. 37. 203–08.
• Mann, W. E. 1989. “Modality, Morality, and God.” Noûs. 23. 83–99.
• Wierenga, E. 1989. The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
• Alston, W. P. 1990. “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists.” In M. Beaty (ed.) Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 303–26.
• Sullivan, S. J. 1993. “Arbitrariness, Divine Commands, and Morality.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 33. 33–45.
• Sullivan, S. J. 1994. “Why Adams Needs to Modify His Divine-Command Theory One More Time.” Faith and Philosophy. 11. 72–81.
• Johnson, J. L. 1994. “Procedure, Substance, and the Divine Command Theory.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 35. 39–55.
• Sagi, A. & D. Statman. 1995. Religion and Morality. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
• Westmoreland, R. 1996. “Two Recent Metaphysical Divine Command Theories of Ethics.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 39. 15–31.
• Mann, W. E. 1998. “Piety: Lending a Hand to Euthyphro.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 58. 123–42.
• Adams, R. M. 1999. Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Hooker, B. 2001. “Cudworth and Quinn.” Analysis. 61. 333–35.
• Alston, W. P. 2002. “What Euthyphro Should Have Said.” In W. L. Craig (ed.) Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 283–98.
• Mawson, T. J. 2002. “God’s Creation of Morality.” Religious Studies. 38. 1–25.
• Joyce, R. 2002. “Theistic Ethics and the Euthyphro Dilemma.” Journal of Religious Ethics. 30. 49–75.
• Mawson, T. J. 2008. “The Euthyphro Dilemma.” Think. 20. 25–33.
• Morriston, W. 2009. “What If God Commanded Something Terrible? A Worry for Divine-Command Meta-Ethics.” Religious Studies. 45. 249–67.
• Hill, S. 2010. “Richard Joyce’s New Objections to the Divine Command Theory.” Journal of Religious Ethics. 38. 189–196.
• Zangwill, N. 2011. “A Way Out of the Euthyphro Dilemma.” Religious Studies. ??. ??–??.

The Frege-Geach Problem

Bibliography of philosophical work on the Frege-Geach problem:

• Geach, P. T. 1958. “Imperative and Deontic Logic.” Analysis. 18. 49–56.
• Geach, P. T. 1960. “Ascriptivism.” Philosophical Review. 69. 221–25.
• Searle, J. 1962. “Meaning and Speech Acts.” Philosophical Review. 71. 423–32.
• Geach, P. T. 1965. “Assertion.” Philosophical Review. 74. 449–65.
• Hare, R. M. 1970. “Meaning and Speech Acts.” Philosophical Review. 79. 3–24.
• Blackburn, S. 1971. “Moral Realism.” In J. Casey (ed.) Morality and Moral Reasoning. London: Methuen. 101–24.
• • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1971. “Moral Realism.” In his Essays in Quasi-Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. 111–29.
• Blackburn, S. 1984. Spreading the Word. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • [Excerpt] Blackburn, S. 1984. “The Frege-Geach Problem.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) 2006. Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 349–59??
• Hale, B. 1986. “The Compleat Projectivist.” Philosophical Quarterly. 36. 65–84.
• Smith, T. 1987. “Moral Realism: Blackburn’s Response to the Frege Objection.” 25. 221–28.
• Schueler, G. F. 1988. “Modus Ponens and Moral Realism.” Ethics. 98. 492–500.
• • [Reprint] Schueler, G. F. 1988. “Modus Ponens and Moral Realism.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) 2006. Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. ??–??.
• Blackburn, S. 1988. “Attitudes and Contents.” Ethics. 98. 501–17.
• • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1988. “Attitudes and Contents.” In his Essays in Quasi-Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. 182–97.
  • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1988. “Attitudes and Contents.” In A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.) 2006. Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. 369–85??
  • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1988. “Attitudes and Contents.” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 474–84.
• Gibbard, A. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Zangwill, N. 1992. “Moral Modus Ponens.” Ratio. 5. 177–93.
• Hale, B. 1992. “Can There Be a Logic of Attitudes?" In J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.) Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 337–63.
• Blackburn, S. 1993. “Gibbard on Normative Logic.” Philosophical Issues. 4. 60–66.
• Stoljar, D. 1993. “Emotivism and Truth Conditions.” Philosophical Studies. 70. 81–101.
• Horwich, P. 1993. “Gibbard’s Theory of Norms” (Review of Wise Choices, Apt Feelings). Philosophy and Public Affairs. 22. 67–78.
• Dreier, J. 1996. “Expressivist Embedding and Minimalist Truth.” Philosophical Studies. 83. 29–51.
• van Roojen, M. 1996. “Expressivism and Irrationality.” Philosophical Review. 105. 311–55.
• Timmons, M. 1999. Morality without Foundations: A Defense of Moral Contextualism. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Unwin, N. 1999. “Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem.” Philosophical Quarterly. 49. 337–52.
• Alm, D. 2000. “Moral Conditionals, Non-Cognitivism and Meaning.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 38. 355–77.
• Unwin, N. 2001. “Norms and Negation: A Problem for Gibbard’s Logic.” Philosophical Quarterly. 51. 60–75.
• Hale, B. 2002. “Can Arboreal Knotwork Help Blackburn out of Frege’s Abyss?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 65. 144–49.
• Gibbard, A. 2003. Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• van Roojen, M. 2005. “Expressivism, Supervenience and Logic.” Ratio. 18. 190–205.
• Sonderholm, J. 2005. “Why an Expressivist Should Not Commit to Commitment-Semantics.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 105. 403–09.
• Horwich, P. 2005. “The Frege-Geach Point.” Philosophical Issues. 15. 78–93.
• Kalderon, M. E. 2005. Moral Fictionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 2006. “Cognitivist Expressivism.” In T. Horgan & M. Timmons (eds.) Metaethics after Moore. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ??–??.
• Marino, P. 2006. “Expressivism, Logic, Consistency, and Moral Dilemmas.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 9. 517–33.
• Blackburn, S. 2006. “The Semantics of Non-Factualism, Non-Cognitivism, and Quasi-Realism.” In M. Devitt & R. Hanley (eds.) The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell. 244–51.
• Dreier, J. 2006. “Negation for Expressivists: A Collection of Problems with a Suggestion for Their Solution”. In R. Shafer-Landau. (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 217–34.
• Elstein, D. 2007. “Against Sonderholm: Still Committed to Expressivism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 107. 111–16.
• Schroeder, M. 2008. “Expression For Expressivists.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 76. 86–116.
• Schroeder, M. 2008. “How Expressivists Can and Should Solve Their Problem With Negation.” Noûs. 42. 573–99.
• Schroeder, M. 2008. Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Schroeder, M. 2008. “What is the Frege-Geach Problem?” Philosophy Compass. 3. 703–20.
• Schroeder, M. 2009. Noncognitivism in Ethics. New York: Routledge.
• Eklund, M. 2009. “The Frege–Geach Problem and Kalderon’s Moral Fictionalism.” Philosophical Quarterly. 59. 705–12.
• Baker, C. 2011??. “Expressivism and Moral Dilemmas: A Response to Marino.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 9. 517–33.

Blackburn’s Supervenience Argument

Bibliography of philosophical work on Blackburn’s supervenience argument:

• Blackburn, S. 1971. “Moral Realism.” In J. Casey (ed.) Morality and Moral Reasoning. London: Methuen. 101–24.
  • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1971. “Moral Realism.” In his Essays in Quasi-Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. 111–29.
• Klagge, J. C. 1984. “An Alleged Difficulty Concerning Moral Properties.” Mind. 93. 370–80.
• Blackburn, S. 1984. Spreading the Word. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Wright, C. 1985. “Review of Spreading the Word.” Mind. 94. 310–19.
• McFetridge, I. G. 1985. “Supervenience, Realism, Necessity.” Philosophical Quarterly. 35. 245–58.
• Blackburn, S. 1985. “Supervenience Revisited.” In I. Hacking (ed.) Exercises in Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 47–67.
  • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1985. “Supervenience Revisited.” In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.) Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1988. 59–75.
  • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1985. “Supervenience Revisited (with Addendum).” In his Essays in Quasi-Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. 130–145.
  • [Reprint] Blackburn, S. 1985. “Supervenience Revisited” In R. Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo (eds.) Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2007. 438–48.
• McFetridge, I. G. 1986. “Review of Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Levy.” Analytic Philosophy. 27. 158–61.
• Shoemaker, S. 1987. “Review of Simon Blackburn’s Spreading the Word.” Noûs. 21. 438–42.
• Elliot, R. 1987. “Moral Realism and the Modal Argument.” Analysis. 47. 133–37.
• Dreier, J. 1993, “The Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism.” Southern Journal of Philosophy. 30. 13–38.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 1994. “Supervenience and Moral Realism.” Ratio. 7. 145–52.
• Zangwill, N. 1995. “Moral Supervenience.” Midwest Studies In Philosophy. 20. 240–62.
• Bovens, L. & D. Drai. 1999. “Supervenience and Moral Realism.” Philosophia. 27. 241–45.
• Drai, D. 2000. “Moral Supervenience and Moral Thinking.” Disputatio. 8. 17–29.
• Sobel, J. H. 2001. “Blackburn’s Problem: On Its Not Insignificant Residue.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 62. 361–83.
• Bloomfield, P. 2001. Moral Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 2003. Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• McNaughton, D. & P. Rawling. 2003. “Naturalism and Normativity: Descriptivism, Normativity, and the Metaphysics of Reasons.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 77 (Supplement). 23–45.
• Mabrito, R. 2005. “Does Shafer-Landau Have a Problem with Supervenience?” Philosophical Studies. 126. 297–311.
• Shafer-Landau, R. 2005. “Replies to Critics.” Philosophical Studies. 126. 313–29.
• Ridge, M. 2007. “Anti-Reductionism and Supervenience.” Journal of Moral Philosophy. 4. 330–48.
• Wisdom, J. 2008. “Base Property Exemplification and Mixed Worlds: Remarks on the Shafer-Landau/Mabrito Exchange.” Philosophical Studies. 138. 429–34.
• Majors, B. 2009. “The Natural and the Normative.” In R. Shafer-Landau (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 4. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 29–52.
• Sonderholm, J. 2009. “Does Blackburn’s Expressivism Have a Problem with Respect to Supervenience? A Reply to Wright and Zangwill.” Metaphysica. 10. 89–95.